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ABSTRACT
"SWALLOWING MEXICO WITHOUT ANY GREASE":
THE ABSENCE OF CONTROVERSY OVER THE FEASIBILITY OF ANNEXING ALL
MEXICO, 1847-1848
by
Timothy Evans Buttram
University of New Hampshire, May, 2008
Advisor: Cynthia J. Van Zandt, Associate Professor of History
This study contributes to the historiography of the "all Mexico"
movement by showing that America's ability to annex its southern
neighbor was never a part of the all Mexico debate. The thesis argues
that c o m m o n American perceptions of the United States a n d Mexico
during the Mexican-American War undermined any grounds on which to
challenge the achievability of annexation.

Chapter I shows that no

politician, regardless of his stance on the value of absorbing Mexico,
questioned the feasibility of doing so. Chapter II then demonstrates that
portrayals of the United States a n d Mexico in American newspapers
supported confidence in the American ability to dominate its enemy.
Finally, chapter III reveals that even American soldiers who c a m e face to
face with the realities of the occupation held similar perceptions a n d
shared the c o m m o n confidence in American capability.
vi

INTRODUCTION

Shortly after arriving in Tampico in late January 1847, two months
after the city had fallen into American hands, Captain Robert Anderson
was told an extraordinary story over dinner. He related it in a letter to his
wife, "An old Mexican about ninety, when [the American flag] was raised,
observed to a man standing near him: '...That flag has been my ruin. I
c a m e from Spain, and I was then young, and was sent into Louisiana; that
flag c a m e and I then went into Florida; in a few years the same flag
c a m e , and I then c a m e to this place expecting never to be disturbed by
it again. But there it is—the same flag, the same people.'" 1
The flag c a m e down when the Mexican-American War e n d e d , but
many Americans had urged that it should not.

In the 1840's Manifest

Destiny was on the march. Before the conflict, President Polk depicted
American expansionism as potentially limitless.

He set a precedent by

stating that if war c a m e with Britain over the Oregon territory, American
efforts could only be compensated by the domination of all of Canada. 2
Similarly, although without President Polk's express approval, the drawnout war with Mexico led many to seek more than the initial territorial goals.
1

Robert Anderson, An Artillery Officer in the Mexican War, 1846-7 (New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1911), 21-2.
2
"The President's Annual Message," N/7es' National Register vol. 69, no. 1,784 (6
December 1845).

1

By late 1847, citing reasons of philanthropy, pragmatism, and destiny,
various Congressmen and activists composed a substantial movement to
annex all of Mexico.
This so-called "all Mexico" movement is at best treated as a novel
and unusual episode in the historiography of the Mexican-American War.
Historians have written little on the issue, favoring broader political and
military themes and a wide array of social and cultural topics. The few
who have dedicated articles to the movement have focused on which
politicians supported or opposed annexation, and why.

Edward G.

Bourne was the first historian to seriously delve into the topic with "The
Proposed Absorption of Mexico, 1847-48," but his work suffers from d a t e d
conclusions a n d a narrow perspective. 3

The next major work in the

historiography is also the most comprehensive. "The Movement for the
Acquisition of All Mexico," a monograph-length account by Joseph D. P.
Fuller, traces the political support for a n d opposition to the movement
from start to finish.4 Other texts feature discussion of the movement but

3

The piece was read at the December 1899 meeting of the American Historical
Association in response to issues being raised in the Spanish American War. His research
question asked why the United States did not absorb Mexico after conquering it, a n d
was based on the assumption that the United States was naturally inclined toward
expansion. Edward G. Bourne, "The Proposed Absorption of Mexico, 1847-48," Annual
Report of the American Historical Association for 1899 vol. 1 (1899): 157-169.
4
Fuller's decision to write "The Movement for the Acquisition of All Mexico" was
prompted by one of his own articles, "The Slavery Question and the Movement to
Acquire Mexico, 1846-1848." The latter text's thesis refutes Bourne's claim that pro-slavery
politicians b a c k e d the movement when it was at its strongest, and features prominently
in Fuller's monograph-length piece. John D. P. Fuller, "The Movement for the Acquisition
of All Mexico," The John Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science vol.
54, no. 1 (1936): 1-176; John D. P. Fuller, "The Slavery Question and the Movement to

2

are not exclusively devoted to it.5 The only author who provides a glimpse
of opinion outside of Washington is John C. Pinheiro, who discusses
activists as well as politicians when analyzing the functions of antiCatholicism in '"Religion without Restriction': Anti-Catholicism, All Mexico,
a n d the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo." 6
While most historians have treated the movement to annex Mexico
as a subject of intense political controversy, none besides Pinheiro have
drawn attention to factors on which all agreed. One such uncontroversial
factor was the feasibility of annexing Mexico, defining annexation strictly
as permanent control and administration over Mexico.

Interestingly,

America's ability to accomplish such a monumental task was not a part of
the debate.
There is ample reason to challenge America's capacity to annex its
neighbor in 1848. Although the United States took half of Mexico's territory

Acquire Mexico, 1846-1848," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review vol. 2 1 , no. 1 (June
1934): 31-48.
5
Frederick Merk notably dedicates several chapters to the subject in his landmark,
controversial book on Manifest Destiny. He, too, focuses on politicians' reasons for
support and opposition, in order to prove that the movement's collapse occurred
because of Manifest Destiny's closer ties to liberal ideology than to expansionism. David
Pletcher also describes all Mexico in The Diplomacy of Annexation as one of several
major instances of expansionist sentiment. However neither author treat the movement
with the degree of depth that John Fuller does. Frederick Merk, Manifest Destiny and
Mission in American History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 107-201;
David M. Pletcher, The Diplomacy of Annexation: Texas, Oregon, and the Mexican War
(Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973).
6
John Pinheiro focuses particularly on the role of anti-Catholicism in popular support a n d
opposition of annexation. He finds that both sides used rhetoric of American superiority.
John C. Pinheiro, '"Religion without Restriction': Anti-Catholicism, All Mexico, and the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo." Journal of the Early Republic vol. 23 (2003): 69-96.

3

at the end of the war, it only absorbed a fraction of its population. 7
Taking the entire country would entail establishing control over a vast,
culturally alien population. Erasing the border might be a simple matter of
decree, but as a consequence the United States would have been f a c e d
with a massive imperial responsibility.

What obstacles would arise, one

c a n only speculate, but they might well have prevented the United States
from retaining its grip on Mexico. However, during this time of seemingly
boundless opportunity, Americans did not see the situation that way.
Contemporary

perceptions

of the United States a n d

Mexico

undermined the grounds on which to contest the feasibility of annexation.
Americans were imbued with a sense of superiority over their southern
neighbor a n d a strong conviction of their own country's abilities.

Many

saw Mexico as a corrupt state populated by a poor, apathetic race who
readily submitted to any authority, and many viewed the United States as
a superior country whose civilized, spirited people could achieve great
feats a n d overcome almost any obstacle.
The primary purpose of the first chapter is to demonstrate that no
politician seriously challenged the achievability of annexing Mexico.
rough chronological order, it follows the President's a n d

In

Senators'

attitudes on how best to resolve the war, at a time when prospects for
p e a c e were at their most distant. This was during the first session of the

7

See Figures 1 & 2 on pages 8 & 9, respectively.

4

Thirtieth Congress, the period when the all Mexico movement had the
most political momentum. The chapter also begins to identify politicians'
perceptions of Mexico and the United States, which helped make
annexation seem achievable.
The second chapter explores the c o m m o n ways that Mexico a n d
the United States were

portrayed

by

near the end

of the

war.

Contemporary newspapers were politically partial and often elaborated
the stances of the parties they supported.

They are useful sources for

fleshing out the perceptions initially identified in the first chapter.

The

articles in these periodicals also contained many common themes which
both reflected and influenced ideas in American society. They led to the
conclusions that Mexico was innocuous a n d that the United States was
superior.

People who a c c e p t e d these themes had g o o d reason to be

confident in America's ability to annex Mexico.
Chapter Three examines the prolific writings of American soldiers
who lived through the realities of the occupation.

Despite often being

confronted with forceful evidence to the contrary, men on the frontline
incorporated into their writings many of the same themes that a p p e a r e d
in periodicals and political speeches. They applied notions of Mexican
inferiority and American dominance to depict the occupation as a
spectacular success, once again giving no reason to question America's
ability to keep what it had conquered.

5

Examining the absence of controversy over America's ability to
absorb Mexico is significant for several reasons. First, it fills a gap in the
historiography of the all Mexico movement. Historians like Edward Bourne
and John Fuller have focused on the reasons behind the movement's
growth and decline, and on the political motives to support or oppose
annexation. This thesis delves deeper into the arguments that politicians
used, highlights one potential controversy that was noticeably missing
from the debate, and offers an explanation for its absence.
Second, this thesis follows John Pinheiro's lead in casting a new light
on the all Mexico movement.

The annexation of Mexico was an

extremely divisive issue in its time, and past historical works accurately
reflect this.

However, on certain facets of the issue, there was an

undercurrent of consensus. This paper emphasizes one such aspect on
which politicians agreed, rather than disagreed. It shows that the debate
was limited to the value and consequences of annexation.
Third, further exploring the all Mexico movement contributes to a
better understanding of Manifest Destiny. Today, the term is treated as
much more than a slogan or identifier of policy.8 Scholars have begun
unpacking the factors that comprised what is now considered the cultural
8

Manifest Destiny was first coined in 1845 by journalist John L. O'Sullivan to describe
America's mission in North America, but Alfred Weinberg was the first to use the term to
define a 19th century American ideology. He describes it as a creed popular with many
Americans, which deftly combined an understanding of American culture and values
with a sense of high purpose. Albert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist
Expansionism in American History (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1935).

6

c o n c e p t of Manifest Destiny.9 Towards this end, analysis of the all Mexico
movement is quite relevant. Those who were for annexation expressed
ideas

of

Saxonism,

expansionism,
and

even

opportunity,
philanthropy,

westward
all

of

momentum,

which

were

Anglo-

important

components of Manifest Destiny.
The perceptions that deterred politicians from earnestly disputing
the feasibility of annexation also reflected key components of Manifest
Destiny.

Ideas

of

Mexican

inferiority

and

American

superiority

demonstrated racism, Anglo-Saxonism, and a general confidence in
American capability.

Whether they supported the movement or not,

Americans c o n c e d e d the imperturbability of American expansion, as
encapsulated in the term destiny. The confidence that was intrinsic to the
ideology of Manifest Destiny left little doubt in the minds of Americans that
the United States could annex Mexico.

9

Frederick Merk challenged Weinberg's thesis in the book Manifest Destiny and Mission in
American History, which described Manifest Destiny as rooted less in expansionism than in
new world idealism. He cited philanthropy as a main reason for the ideology's
popularity. Amy S. Greenberg and Reginald Horsman, respectively, point out that
rhetoric of masculinity and Anglo-Saxonism also helped construct the c o n c e p t a n d
make it ring true. Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission; Amy S. Greenberg, Manifest
Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005); Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origin of American
Racial Anglo-Saxons (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).

7
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FIGURE 1:
This m a p shows the United States expanding at Mexico's expense. The
dark area is Texas, annexed in 1845 to the Nueces River. In dark stripes is
land that had been claimed by both Texas and Mexico. This dispute was
resolved with the signing of the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, which
c e d e d this territory a n d the land in light stripes to the United States.
Sir Adolphus William Ward, G.W. Prothero, Sir Stanley Mordaunt Leathes,
a n d E.A. Benians eds., The Cambridge Modern History Atlas (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1912), 71. Courtesy of the University of Texas
Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin.

8

FIGURE 2:
Despite sustaining the massive territorial losses depicted in Figure 1,
Mexico retained the majority of its population within its borders after the
war. In the absence of exact demographic data, this 1847 m a p of
Mexican states roughly demonstrates population density through the size
of e a c h administrative region.
Denser areas required tighter
administration, while sparser regions could afford to be less centralized.
The size of Alta California is dramatic in relation to states south of the Rio
Grande, emphasizing the location of Mexico's population core. As a note
of interest, this American-made m a p was used in preparing the Treaty of
Guadalupe-Hidalgo and a p p e n d e d to the treaty itself.
J. Disturnell, " M a p a d e los Estados Unidos de Mejico," General Records of
the U.S. Government, RG11.
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CHAPTER I

THE FEASIBILITY OF ANNEXING MEXICO IN CONGRESSIONAL DIALOGUE
DURING THE LAST MONTHS OF THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN WAR

When the 30 th Congress assembled in December 1847, the United
States was facing

a

dilemma.

The Mexican-American

progressed into its second year, but despite spectacular

War

had

American

battlefield victories, p e a c e remained elusive. The remnants of the central
Mexican government seemed to Senator Lewis Cass to evoke a "national
obstinacy," refusing to yield even when its armies and cities had fallen. 10
With a treaty nowhere in sight, the president a n d the legislature were
f a c e d with a decision that not only would affect the way the war would
be carried on, but might drastically alter the course of the country.
According to Senator John Calhoun, "I believe the pressing question at
this moment is, whether w e shall conquer Mexico, and hold her as a
subjected province, or incorporate her into our union." 11

10

The Congressional Globe, 30 th Cong., 1st sess. vol. 17 (Washington D.C.: Blair and Rives,
1848), 114. Historian Gene Brack makes a compelling argument that Mexicans deeply
feared the combination of American racism a n d expansionism. Thus they remained
reluctant to agree to a treaty surrendering land, even after their country was o c c u p i e d ,
as it might be the first step down a slippery slope. Gene M. Brack, "Mexican Opinion,
American Racism, a n d the War of 1846," The Wesiem Historical Quarterly vol. 1, no. 2
(April 1970), 167.
1
' Congressional Globe 53.

10

Two years earlier that question was far from most people's thoughts.
The Mexican-American War had not been intended to be a war of total
conquest. It had begun over a territorial dispute in southern Texas, a n d
although many Americans favored capitalizing on the conflict by seizing
valuable

Mexican

provinces,

only

a

handful

of

ultra-expansionists

a d v o c a t e d solving the dispute by eliminating the country of Mexico
altogether. 12

Indeed, even limited territorial objectives were subject to

intense debate in Congress, where Whigs criticized the legitimacy of
demanding land for a war that they believed was unjust, and the issue of
whether or not to allow slavery loomed over any potential territorial
cessions. In Washington, the prospect of absorbing the whole country of
Mexico was out of the question. 13
Yet as the war drew on, public sentiment for absorbing Mexico
grew.

Washington politicians repeatedly disavowed any intention of

deliberately pursuing annexation, but the drawn-out occupation

12

of

"Our true policy is, to go on in strengthening the Union—carrying out the annexation
policy—to drop all small questions, a n d boldly grasp the larger one. In fact, to annex the
whole of Mexico, instead of California—to merge the two republics into one, instead of
taking a slice for breakfast to-day a n d another for dinner to-morrow. We shall be
compelled to do this... as a means of protection of our free and happy institutions." This
extreme sentiment only appears in The New York Herald before the war. "Foreign
Interference-Annexation the True Policy of America," The New York Herald, 20 January
1846,2.
13
Politicians only began to seriously consider annexation when several situations
converged at the end of 1847. Public calls for annexation were becoming louder a n d
more difficult to ignore. Also, the d e b a t e over slavery in new territory had lost urgency,
potentially reducing the friction caused by land acquisitions. Most importantly, the latest
treaty negotiations had failed and p e a c e with Mexico a p p e a r e d to be nowhere in sight.
Fuller, "The Movement for the Acquisition of All Mexico," 104.

11

Mexico was looking increasingly like it could be resolved in no other way.14
Those who supported sustaining the American military presence, including
the President and many Democratic senators, argued that the occupying
forces, if properly supplied, could carry on indefinitely and even establish
a level of jurisdiction over the country. Some senators went further and
expounded on the benefits of annexing Mexico in case it did occur,
already convinced that the deed was achievable.

Meanwhile, many

Whigs and several Democrats headed by Senator Calhoun passionately
opposed eliminating the country of Mexico or pursuing any path that
would lead to that result.
Tellingly, though, politicians rarely questioned America's ability to
accomplish such a mammoth task. Instead, they described Mexico as
undesirable or innocuous, deeply undermining the notion that Mexicans
could or would mount any effective resistance. By contrast, the United
States was depicted as a powerful belligerent that held the fate of
Mexico in its hands. The ways that the United States and Mexico were
portrayed in debates over how to further prosecute the war offered no
serious reason to doubt America's ability to annex Mexico.

14

Senator Cass insisted, "There is no man in this nation in favor of the extinction of the
nationality of Mexico." Congressional Globe 54. Senator Niles believed "it to be the
general sentiment of this body that the conquest of this extensive country is not desired."
Congressional Globe 55. Yet Senators Calhoun, Clayton, Pearce, Mangum, Butler, Cass,
a n d Clarke, a m o n g others, all agreed that annexation was a potential consequence of
pursuing a policy of occupation, for better or for worse. Congressional Globe 79, 151,
177, 183, 188,216,244.

12

This chapter traces the discussion of annexation's feasibility in
Washington, defining annexation strictly as interminable domination.15
The absence of serious challenges to the controversial plan's feasibility
reveals a notable instance of skewed worldview that was firmly
entrenched in American politicians' minds. These perceptions reflected
the confidence that was key to the contemporary cultural concept of
Manifest Destiny.
The Thirtieth Congress, before the passage of the Treaty of
Guadalupe-Hidalgo, when peace was nowhere in sight, witnessed some
of the most intense debates over America's prospects in Mexico. The first
section analyzes the President's views, principally through his December 7
message to Congress. The remainder of the essay follows, in roughly
chronological order, the Senate dialogue over the further prosecution of
the war.

War-related debates in the Whig-dominated House of

Representatives still dwelled on the two-year-old just war issue, revealing
relatively little about Representatives' perspectives on the feasibility of
Mexico's annexation.16 Senators, by comparison, give considerably more
insight in their debates over the Ten-Regiment Bill and Senator Calhoun's
,5

Whether or not Mexico could be incorporated into the Union was by contrast a subject
of great controversy. However, there is no evidence of doubt that the country could be
dominated.
16
For a summary of the significance of the House of Representatives in the all Mexico
movement, see Bourne, "The Proposed Absorption of Mexico," 169, and Fuller, "The
Movement for the Acquisition of All Mexico," 99-100. Bourne believes that Whig
domination of the House was a key reason why Mexican sovereignty was preserved, but
the record does not support this argument. Fuller notes that the House was unable to
mount a unified, restraining stance on foreign policy.

13

resolution to avoid annexation.

Admittedly politicians' words will not

always match their beliefs, but overall their messages a n d debates are
accessible documents that provide some indication of their views.17

President Polk's Message to Congress
When the legislature convened in December 1847, President Polk
issued to Congress an annual message that outlined his stance on the
direction of policy over the next few months. Despite Mexico's continuing
refusal to a c c e p t the original American terms, Polk urged that territorial
concessions were the only viable form of indemnity Mexicans could offer
for a war in which, he insisted, they were the aggressors.18 He had been
elected on the promise of adding territory to the Union, a n d he was not
about to change his stance now that American troops controlled Mexico
City. However, in this annual address, Polk also felt compelled to clarify
that his territorial objectives were limited; he had no designs to absorb
Mexico entirely.19 He m a d e no mention of any pragmatic concerns for

17

The legislative debates of the mid-nineteenth century were d o c u m e n t e d in the
Congressional Globe, an independently published series sponsored by the government
and tasked with accurately recording Congressional proceedings.
Although
occasionally the perspective shifts from first person to third person, the debates of the
Thirtieth Congress were mostly transcribed verbatim. The reporting is detailed enough to
deliver a n accurate account of the debates.
18
Senate Executive Document 1, Message from the President of the United States, 30 th
Cong., ls'sess., 1847,8.
19
"It has never been contemplated by me, as an object of the war, to make a
permanent conquest of the republic of Mexico, or to annihilate her separate existence
as an independent nation." Sen. Exec. Doc 14. Fuller accurately notes that this was the
first time annexation had been explicitly addressed in Polk's annual messages, indicating

14

the consequences of such a bold move, only saying that he had adopted
the position because the United States "have always desired to be on
terms

of

amity

and

good

neighborhood

with

her

[Mexico]."20

Nonetheless, Polk's resolutions on how the war should be prosecuted in
the coming months did not render annexation out of the question.
Though he may have wished to avoid absorbing Mexico, the suggestions
and opinions expressed in his annual message did not give cause to
doubt annexation's achievability.
President Polk promoted two paths toward peace in his address,
which effectively amounted to the carrot and the stick. One option was
to use America's control over the country to force reform upon the
allegedly corrupt Mexican republic.

Polk sympathized with

"the

peaceable and well disposed inhabitants of Mexico" who wanted peace
but feared political reprisal for speaking out.21 Eliminating military tyranny
and factionalism by establishing and enforcing a stable republican
government might encourage Mexicans finally to accept a treaty. But if
after this Mexico still remained obstinate, Polk ominously warned Congress,
"then we shall have exhausted all honorable means in pursuit of peace,
and must continue to occupy her country with our troops, taking the full

the momentum that the all Mexico movement h a d gained in 1847.
Movement for the Acquisition of All Mexico," 98.
20 Sen. Exec. Doc. 14.
21
Sen. Exec. Doc. 15.

15

Fuller, "The

measure of indemnity into our hands, a n d must enforce the terms which
our honor demands." 2 2
The second option, construed above as a last resort, was to coerce
the Mexican people into accepting a p e a c e by making them more
acutely experience the stresses of war. Mexican resolve had exasperated
the President. At the outset of the war, President Polk asserted, it had
been a point of pride for the United States to make every effort to be
generous to its opponents.

Yet the Mexicans proved "to be wholly

incapable

our forbearance

of appreciating

a n d liberality,"

having

snubbed American goodwill by launching a large resistance movement
against the benevolent occupiers. 23

Unworthy of special treatment,

Mexico would be forced to a d o p t the burden of funding and supplying
the war effort that it itself had prolonged.

The country would remain

occupied until Mexico a c c e p t e d a treaty.
Reforming the allegedly corrupt Mexican government was a noble
idea, but it is doubtful that President Polk ever intended to pursue this
course. By the time he had issued his annual message, he had already
issued orders to military commanders to take measures to procure supplies
22

Sen. Exec. Doc. 15.
President Polk wrote to Congress, "Not appreciating our forbearance, the Mexican
people generally b e c a m e hostile to the United States, a n d availed themselves of every
opportunity to commit the most savage excesses upon our troops. Large numbers of the
population took up arms, a n d , engaging in guerilla warfare, robbed a n d murdered in the
most cruel manner individual soldiers, or small parties, who accident or other causes h a d
separated from the main body of our army; bands of guerilleros a n d robbers infested the
roads, harassed our trains, a n d , whenever it was in their power, cut off our supplies." Sen.
Exec. Doc. 17.
23

16

and funds from their surroundings. Also, his administrafion had recalled
negotiator Nicholas Trist in an attempt to terminate the American peace
initiative.24 Polk had clearly decided that Mexico should be put under
greater pressure, but would that translate to a swift conclusion of the war?
These actions were done with an eye toward forcing the Mexican
government to accept peace. However, with the Mexican government
in disarray, no vital areas left to conquer, and, had Trist followed his orders,
no official agent in Mexico to negotiate a treaty, the prospects for peace
were increasingly distant. In choosing to pressure Mexico, Polk was well
aware that the he might be committing the American army to an
occupation of indefinite length. In preparation, requests for significant
increases in funds and manpower were included in his message to
Congress. To keep the war effort financed through July 30, 1849, Polk
asked for an additional loan of $25,500,000.25 Furthermore, he appealed
for the authority to recruit not only more volunteers, whose twelve month
service limits were apparently inadequate, but also an additional force of
regulars, to be discharged upon the ratification of a peace treaty.26

24

Secretary of State Buchanan to Nicholas P. Trist, 6 October 1847, in James Buchanan,
The Works of James Buchanan vol. 7, e d . John Bassett Moore (New York: Antiquarian
Press Ltd., 1960), 427. Nicholas Trist was an agent of the President sent to negotiate a
treaty with Mexico after the Slidell mission had failed. The Mexican government
vacillated in its cooperation, but after nine months of hard work a n d disobeying a direct
executive order to withdraw, Trist was able to secure the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo.
Louis Martin Sears, "Nicholas P. Trist, A Diplomat with Ideals," The Mississippi Valley
Historical Review vol. 11, no. 1 (June 1924), 96.
25 Sen. Exec. Doc. 24.
26
Sen. Exec. Doc. 19.
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President

Polk

expected

the

impending

occupation

to

be

expensive in money and manpower, but his decision was a calculated
one that he thought was within the American capability to achieve. For
one, it is apparent that he thought Mexican resistance would not prohibit
the success of a properly supplied occupation. Although Polk reasonably
identified the widespread guerilla activity in occupied territory as a
resistance movement, he cited it as evidence of Mexican uncouthness,
not as an actual obstacle to American ambitions. 27

His willingness to

alienate the population even further by instituting a system of forced
indemnity indicated how little Mexican resistance concerned him.
President Polk also employed rhetoric that reflected a genuine
belief in American strength and Mexican weakness. Mexican power was
repeatedly described as "feeble," often in direct contrast to American
power. 28 Americans, meanwhile, were described as "hardy, enterprising

27

President Polk's quotation cited in footnote 22 clearly acknowledged that guerilla
attacks were not acts of generic criminality, but strikes specifically targeting the
American occupation.
However, he emphasized that their hostility was an
unappreciative and rude reaction to America's generous occupation policy, not a
threat to the occupation.
28
"That it might be manifest not only to Mexico, but to all other nations, that the United
States were not disposed to take a d v a n t a g e of a feeble power..." 9. "Mexico is too
feeble a power to govern these provinces..." 9-10. In reference to a hypothetical
independent California created by local revolutionaries, "Such a government would be
too feeble long to maintain its separate independent existence..." 10. "Mexico has
been, and must continue to be too feeble to restrain them [savages] from committing
depredations, robberies a n d murders, not only upon the inhabitants of New Mexico itself,
but upon those of the other northern States of Mexico. It would be a blessing to all these
northern States to have their citizens protected against them by the power of the United
States." Sen. Exec. Doc. 11.
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and

intelligent." 29

One

passage

exuded

praise tor the

valorous

accomplishments of American arms, exclaiming, "Every patriot's heart
must exult, and a just national pride animate every bosom, in beholding
the high proofs of courage, consummate military skill, steady discipline,
a n d humanity to the vanquished enemy, exhibited by our gallant
army..." 30

Some of the language that the President used was surely

exaggerated, but overall his message reveals a glimpse of

Polk's

understanding of the situation, where Mexico was at the mercy of the
United States.
The information that Polk was being fed by advisors a n d generals
reinforced this optimistic appraisal of the situation.

General Scott had

already developed and conveyed a plan for a prolonged occupation of
Mexico, complete with specific details on the support needed to achieve
it.31 In addition to consolidating American dominance over the country
by continuing to control key strategic points, Scott also committed
Mexican assets to pay a portion of the costs that would inevitably

29

Sen. Exec. Doc. 10.
Sen. Exec. Doc. 5.
31
In a letter written after the capture of Mexico City cited by Senator Cass, General Scott
wrote, "Augment this army to fifty thousand men to enable them to occupy, at the same
time, nearly all the State capitals and other principal cities; to drive guerilla a n d other
robbing parties from the great highways of trade; to seize into our hands all the ordinary
revenues of the country, internal as well as external, for the support of the occupation,
a n d to keep the central Government in constant motion a n d alarm, until constrained to
sue for p e a c e . " Congressional Globe 150. In a separate letter to Secretary of War
Marcy, Scott wrote, "Annexation and military occupation would be, if w e maintain the
annexation, one and the same thing, as to the amount of force to be employed by us."
General Scott to Secretary of War Marcy, 25 December 1847, quoted in Scott 560-561.
30
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accumulate over the indefinite duration of the occupation. 3 2

As the

President had requested, the promised twelve to fifteen million dollars
would reduce the amount of money paid from the American treasury,
which from 1846 to 1848 had amounted to $58 million.33

Scott's

confidence in his provisional solution seemed to demonstrate, on paper,
that Mexico was susceptible to American control and even some degree
of administration.
Meanwhile, several other generals strongly urged that Polk do away
with unnecessary pretenses and annex Mexico outright. 34

General

Quitman submitted an impassioned essay trumpeting the reasons why
Mexico should be stripped of its independence.

Annexation was

achievable because, "It [Mexico] is already prostrated...

With ten

thousand men, w e can hold this capital a n d Vera Cruz, and keep open a
safe communication between the two points. Possessing the heart, there

32

"The war being virtually over, I now gave attention to a system of finance for the
support of the army and to stimulate overtures of p e a c e . The subject required extensive
inquiries and careful elaboration. My intention was to raise the first year about twelve
millions of dollars, with the least possible pressure on the industry and wealth of the
country, with an. increase to fifteen millions in subsequent years. The plan is given at
large, in seven papers (four reports a n d three orders). See Ex. Doc. No. 60, H. of R., 30th
Congress, 1st Session, p. 1046, and following. The orders are here omitted and the
finance details, contained in the four reports, also." Winfield Scott, Memoirs of LieutGeneral Scott LL.D. vol. 2 (New York: Sheldon & Company, 1864), 553.
33
K. Jack Bauer, The Mexican War 1846-1848 (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1974),
397.
34
Several politicians c o m m e n t e d on the prevalence of annexation sentiment a m o n g
military leaders. Senator Niles remarked, "No one c a n mistake that it is the sentiment of
the army... that this war is only to end with the conquest of Mexico."
Congressional
Globe 55. James Gadsden wrote, "I have not yet seen the officer that is not for
conquest." James Gadsden to Senator Calhoun, 28 December 1847, in John C.
Calhoun, The Papers of John C. Calhoun vol. 25, e d . Clyde N. Wilson & Shirley Bright Cook
(Charleston, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), 46.
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could be no sufficient force concentrated to annoy us."35 General Worth
was equally sure that annexation was both desirable and possible, albeit
unconcerned about the details. As he frankly admitted to Secretary of
War Marcy, "After much reflection I have arrived at the conclusion that it
is our decided policy to hold the whole of Mexico—The details of the
occupation are comparatively unimportant—I mean by occupation,
permanent conquest and future annexation..."36 While the President may
or may not have been receptive to their clamor, their case could only
reinforce Polk's contention that the state of things in Mexico was
conducive to a successful, lengthy occupation. 37
The external threat to the war effort that, from the outset,
Americans were most apt to take seriously did not come from Mexico, but
from across the Atlantic.

Great Britain, with her powerful military and

broad international interests, was, unlike Mexico, perceived to be a
country to be reckoned with.

Although President Polk had spoken

confidently about the prospects of victory in an Anglo-American conflict,
most Americans wanted to avoid war with Britain, particularly while

35

Letter from Major General Quitman, 15 October 1847, General Scott and His Staff
(Philadelphia: Grigg, Elliot & Co., 1848), 103.
36
General Worth to Secretary of War Marcy, 30 October 1847, Marcy MSS, quoted in
Fuller, "The Movement for the Acquisition of All Mexico," 94.
37
Although President Polk was well-known for territorial ambitions, the only official position
he ever a d o p t e d toward annexation was its explicit rejection. No evidence suggests
that he ever actually w a n t e d to take all of Mexico. However, had p e a c e been delayed
any longer, Polk may well have a d d e d all land to the Sierra Madre to his demands.
Fuller, "The Movement for the Acquisition of All Mexico," 126.
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locked in battle with Mexico.38 British intervention in the Mexican War had
been a genuine, though distant, concern earlier in the war.39 But by mid1847, George Bancroft, who had been sent on a mission to England by
Secretary of State Buchanan, relayed to the administration that British
statesmen were resigned to American dominance over Mexico, and that
they regarded drastic extensions of American boundaries an "inevitable
necessity."40 British sentiment, according to Bancroft, was embodied by
Lord Palmerston's comment, "They are going to take two-thirds of Mexico.
They might as well take the whole."41

This suggested that the United

States would be free to choose how to conclude its war with Mexico.
There is insufficient evidence to determine whether or not President
Polk thought the annexation of Mexico was possible, since he never
addressed that aspect of the issue directly. He believed Mexicans had
the right and perhaps, with American help, the capability to govern
themselves, and ended the discussion at that.

38

President Polk predicted victory in a war over Oregon and C a n a d a as late as
December 1845. "The President's Annual Message," N/7es' National Register vol. 69, no.
1,784 (6 December 1845). However, most Americans welcomed the June 1846 Oregon
settlement because it removed the grounds for conflict with Great Britain. Pletcher, The
Diplomacy of Annexation, 414.
39
General Taylor gave a sober appraisal of Britain and the Mexican War, writing, "I
apprehend no outbreak with England, be her cause of grievances what they may; she
cannot do without our trade; although our people might be ready to rush into war with
her; since our unprecedented success in Mexico; but should w e have to measure
strength with John Bull, w e will find some difference between him & the Mexicans."
Zachary Taylor, Letters of Zachary Taylor from the Battle-Fields of the Mexican War e d .
William K. Bixby (Rochester, NY: The Genesee Press, 1908), 131.
40
George Bancroft to Secretary of State Buchanan, 18 May 1847, in Buchanan 309.
41
George Bancroft to Secretary of State Buchanan, 18 May 1847, in Buchanan 310.
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However, President Polk's annual address did reveal he was
optimistic that indefinite occupation was a practicable policy course.
Garrisoning the country for an indeterminate period of time shared many
traits with annexation.

The absorption of Mexico may well have even

been the culmination of that policy. Polk's conviction of the feasibility of
indefinite occupation could only strengthen his confidence that Mexico
could be annexed.

For example, his contention that order could be

maintained despite a widespread guerilla movement a n d an indemnity
policy that would further estrange the Mexican population, combined
with the rhetoric he used to describe the two countries, supported the
idea that these obstacles could be overcome in an all Mexico context.
Some asserted that the policies of occupation a n d annexation amounted
to the same thing, as Senator John M. Clayton asked, "Pray, sir, what d o
you call keeping the Central Government in motion, occupying the State
capitals, a n d seizing the revenues of Mexico? I call it subjugation of the
country a n d an annihilation of the Government of Mexico." 42 Even if his
message did not explicitly comment on the achievability of taking all
Mexico, it certainly did not give cause for doubt that Mexico could be
dominated.

42

Congressional Globe 151.
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Senator Cass' Ten-Regiment Bill
President Polk's message to Congress stated plainly the forceful
mode in which he wished to prosecute the war, but the decision was not
entirely the President's to make.

It was up to Congress to provide the

President with the resources and manpower with which to conduct his
policy of choice. Polk's supporters f a c e d opposition from both members
of the rival Whig party a n d dissenting Democrats, so many senators were
not about to allow the President's plan go unchallenged. 4 3 Senator John
Berrien demonstrated the attitude of many of his peers when he asserted
legislative authority, saying, "We should determine for ourselves—not at
the bidding of the President, but for ourselves, as the constitutional
depository of the war-making power—what are the objects to

be

accomplished." 4 4 For two long months legislators would d e b a t e over the
future course of the war, including the viability of the controversial all
Mexico movement.
As soon as the 30 th Congress assembled. Senators were anxious to
begin passing legislation influencing the policy of the war. On December
15, 1847, two Democrats submitted resolutions pertaining to the future
prosecution of the war. Senator John Calhoun of South Carolina called

43

The composition of the 30th congress was thirty-eight Democrats, twenty-one Whigs,
and one Independent, and the majority party suffered from considerable disunity.
44
Congressional Globe 79.
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for an official statement of intent to avoid annexing Mexico.45 Shortly
thereafter, Senator Daniel Dickenson of New York countered with a
request that the United States annex as much territory as would be
deemed expedient.46 In addition to these resolutions. Senator Lewis Cass
of Michigan had introduced a bill calling for the increase in the army
sought by President Polk.

He, too, expected its prompt consideration.

Naturally, a day was spent deciding whose contribution had priority as
each argued that his was the most vital. Senator Cass' Ten Regiment Bill
eventually won precedence, but its succinct consideration was not to be.
The necessity of an army increase, its potential implications for the fate of
Mexico, and the justice of the war itself all became fair game in the
Senate deliberation over Senator Cass' bill. The debate became a catchall for all issues surrounding the continued prosecution of the war, and did
not conclude before the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo rendered each
man's proposed legislation essentially moot.
Before Senator Cass had much of an opportunity to defend his bill,
it came under attack. Cass' contention that the army urgently needed to
be augmented was a prime target for criticism. Senator John Berrien of
Georgia, a Whig, dismissed the need for more troops, saying, "It is evident
45

"Resolved, That no line of policy in the further prosecution of the war should be
a d o p t e d which may lead to consequences so disastrous [the incorporation of Mexico
into the Union]." Congressional Globe 26.
46
"Resolved, That true policy requires the Government of the United States to strengthen
its political a n d commercial relations upon this continent, by the annexation of such
contiguous territory as may conduce to that end, and c a n be justly obtained..."
Congressional Globe 27.
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that the army in Mexico was perfectly safe—flushed with victory, and
confident in its strength... while the army of the enemy is scattered,
dispersed, and Mexico is without an efficient government, and destitute of
resources and men to resist our arms."47 In the same vein, Senator John
Crittenden of Kentucky, also a Whig, asked, "If Mexico now lies prostrate
before you, without an army or government; with here and there only a
body of guerillas, instead of an army to oppose you, what, in the name of
Heaven, if this is all that is left of her, do you want with ten thousand more
troops?"48 According to their argument, the only realistic threat to the
United States could be found on a battlefield. Being far too weak to
organize and field another army, Mexico "was now nothing but a huge
undigested mass of vanity and faction." 49 The country was defanged in
their view and entirely at America's mercy.

Save for the trifling "few

skirmishes here and there with parties of guerrillas," the road in front of the
occupation forces was clear.50
Democratic supporters of the bill disputed this line of reasoning,
emphasizing the difference between a war and an occupation. Senator
Jefferson Davis of Mississippi conceded that, even at its current size, the
American army could march through South America and defeat every
army it encountered, but routing conventional forces was no longer the
47

Congressional
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49
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Congressional
48
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79.
112.
114.
113.
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task at hand. Although Mexico had been defeated militarily, he ventured
that "we have not even suppressed the hostility of the Mexican people...
Mexico is not conquered." 5 1 Senator William Allen of Ohio lent even more
urgency to the situation, listing the tremendous obstacles facing American
forces:
Well, sir, under these circumstances, with that army cut, hacked,
a n d bleeding in the achievement of its glorious victories, shall w e
leave them there, to occupy a country as large as our own,
surrounded by ten millions of enemies, a n d subjected to all the
perils to which their precarious situation exposes them, without
taking
the
precaution
to
sustain
them
by
additional
reinforcements? 52
Senator Allen's appraisal of the situation certainly suggested that
the occupation force was in dire straits, but the gravity of these obstacles
was tempered by the notion that they could be overcome. The United
States, according to Senator Cass, had proven itself to be a m o n g "the
mightiest nations of the world." 5 3

With enough soldiers, the American

army could not only endure these burdens, but even reduce the
likelihood of resistance. Cass believed that a large force would intimidate
the population into submission, a n d perhaps, as the merits of American
administration sank in over time, reconcile them to the United States.54
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Congressional Globe 114.
Congressional Globe 80.
53
Congressional Globe 88.
54
"It is much better to render opposition hopeless, by the display of strength, than to
excite it into action, by the display of weakness." Congressional Globe 88. "With few
sympathies to unite them to us, we can continue to govern them, and govern them with
energy and justice, such as are new in their history... till the experience of our sway and
52
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Thus, although Democratic supporters of President Polk's policy admitted
that the troubles that the occupation army faced were serious, they also
perceived that those difficulties were surmountable in both the short and
long terms.55
Other Whigs opposed the bill from an entirely different angle.
According to Senator John Hale of New Hampshire, Senator John Clayton
of Delaware, and Senator Reverdy Johnson of Maryland, voting to
enlarge the army would be wrong because the whole war was unjust.
Senator Johnson offered a description of the regretable situation. "She
surrenders. Yet still our vengeance is not glutted. Innocent, unoffending,
outraged Mexico has yet more cities to be laid to waste or conquered...
[by] the mighty and crushing power of our arms."56 The legitimacy of the
war was frequently contested by Whig Congressmen in the House of
Representatives, as well.57 Congressman John Van Dyke of New Jersey
argued that the pursuit of the war and indemnity, with "our conquering
sword gleaming above her, is unreasonable and unfair towards Mexico...

its operation around them shall have brought them to a better state of feeling."
Congressional Globe 89.
55
Senator Crittenden, meanwhile, insisted that Senator Cass in fact "did not apprehend
any danger" from the threats that he treated so seriously, instead desiring the army
increase for "any possible contingency." Even if Crittenden was correct and the
Democrats' argument was not genuine, the prospects for the success of the occupation
still seemed good. Congressional Globe 113.
56
Congressional Globe 140. Senator Hale agreed that, "The country is engaged in a war
which is unjustifiable; we confess it is wrong to go on." Congressional Globe 122. Senator
Clayton equated conquest to robbery. Congressional Globe 151.
57
On one day alone, four Whig Congressmen issued resolutions calling for wartime
restraint on these grounds. See the resolutions of Congressmen Bott, Thompson, Toombs,
and Van Dyke. Congressional Globe 61-62.
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and unmagnanimous and unchristian in us."58 Innocent, weak Mexico
was at the mercy of American arms, so it was up to politicians to direct
the United States along a path that was more becoming of an honorable,
Christian nation.
No matter their attitude toward the Ten-Regiment Bill, politicians
portrayed a scenario where the prospects of a successful occupation
were good.

If the extra regiments were deemed unnecessary, it was

because American power had already eliminated any relevant Mexican
resistance. If reinforcements were needed, it was to ensure that Mexican
resistance would be overcome. Finally, if the continued prosecution of
the war was unjust, it was because Mexico was an innocent victim.
Images of Mexican innocence were accompanied by images of
defenselessness in the face of American power. Each line of reasoning
featured the persistent theme of Mexican weakness and American
strength. In the context of annexation, it would be difficult to argue, by
these politicians' estimates, that Mexico could offer effective resistance to
American domination.

The Debate over the Value of Annexation
The

direction

of

the

Ten-Regiment

Bill

debate

changed

considerably on January 11 when Senator John Clayton expanded on the

58

Congressional Globe 62.
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Whigs' unjust war thesis by venturing that increasing the army a n d
following the President's occupation plan would lead to an equally unjust
annexation of Mexico. 59 Although Senator Calhoun had implied this same
point in a verbal explanation of his resolution one week earlier, only now
did it begin to gain momentum. Quickly the d e b a t e transformed into a
discussion of the value of absorbing Mexico, which some claimed to have
merit and others argued to be "among the greatest calamities that could
happen." 6 0

In their

arguments,

however,

neither

group

seriously

challenged the American capability to realize the annexation. Indeed,
many Senators had concrete concepts of an

American-dominated

Mexico, which they fully expected would be realized once the decision
was m a d e to annex Mexico.
Senator Calhoun had fired the first shot in this conflict well before it
had fully developed. He had predicted that the war would not quickly
resolve, and feared that the President's plan of "conquering p e a c e "
would inevitably "have blotted her [Mexico] out of the list of nations," in
the same way that England stumbled into control of India. 61 Aware that
any conclusion to the war, no matter how drastic, might increase in
appeal as the stalemate dragged on, Calhoun tailored his resolution to
deny the option of annexation.
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Congressional Globe 151.
Congressional Globe 79.
61
Congressional Globe 96, 97.
60
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On January 4 Calhoun received the opportunity to give his
reasoning and presented his argument point by point. First, annexation
was inconsistent with the object of the war. The United States needed to
disprove international suspicions of American ambition and belligerence,
and

reemphasize

America's

traditional

reputation

for

"wisdom,

moderation, discretion, justice, and other high qualities."62
Second, there was no precedent of forcing a people into the
Union.63 Nor was there a reason to start now, because, as his third point,
"we have never dreamt of incorporating into our Union any but the
Caucasian race—the free white race." To place the "Indians and mixed
race of Mexico" on equality with Anglo-Saxons would be "fatal to our
institutions."64
Senator Calhoun's fourth and fifth points elaborated on the theme
that annexation was inconsistent with American traditions. Conquest was
not in keeping with republican ideals, and would be subversive to those
ideals by establishing empire. His sixth, final point was that Mexico could
never be fully incorporated into the United States, since forcing
annexation would require a constant military presence. "Never will the
time come," Calhoun warned, "that these Mexicans will be heartily
reconciled to your authority... Of all nations on the earth they are the
62

Congressional Globe 98.
Native Americans, Senator Calhoun notes, "have either been left as an independent
people amongst us, or been driven into the forests." Congressional Globe 98.
64
Congressional Globe 98.
63

31

most pertinacious... [and] hold out longest, and often even with the least
prospect of effecting their object." Even if the population was somehow
acquiescent, he reemphasized that it was a mistake to absorb those
"ignorant and unfit for liberty, unpure races." All precautions had to be
taken to avoid the "great and fatal mistake" of annexing Mexico.65
Although Senator Calhoun provided an exhaustive list of concerns,
it is evident that the American ability to control and administer a
conquered Mexico was not chief among of them.

When making his

argument, Calhoun had governmental templates in mind. He expected
the American administration to be in sufficient control to first implement
territorial government, and then to try to fully incorporate Mexico into the
United States.66 Although Calhoun did not think that the Mexican estados
would ever truly integrate into the predominantly Anglo-Saxon states of
the Union, he did predict the territory would resemble a colony, held by
force, along the lines of British India or Ireland.67

His fundamental

argument was that having such a colony would be detrimental to the
United States.

Ultimately, though Calhoun thought the annexation of

65

Congressional Globe 99.
"You c a n establish a Territorial Government for every State in Mexico, a n d there are
some twenty of them. You c a n appoint governors, judges, a n d magistrates. You c a n
give the people a subordinate government, allowing them to legislate for themselves,
whilst you defray the cost. So far as law goes, the thing is done." Congressional Globe
97.
67
"We see England with dependant provinces... [Mexico] will be but a Provincial
Government, under the name of a Territorial Government." Calhoun c o m p a r e d an
American-dominated Mexico specifically to "Hindostan" a n d Ireland, as well as to British
colonies in general, arguing that such colonies would be ineffectual burdens to the
United States. Congressional Globe 96, 97.
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Mexico would be an expensive, heavy burden, his worry that it could in
fact be achieved was a primary motivation for submitting the resolution.
With Senator Clayton's warning about the imminent eventuality of
absorbing Mexico, other Senators joined Calhoun in proclaiming the
pitfalls of annexation.

Senator Andrew Butler, the other Democratic

Senator of South Carolina, seconded many of his colleague's reservations.
Conquering Mexico was costly, and invited tyranny in the United States.68
Meanwhile, Senator James Pearce of Maryland, a Whig, predicted
particularly dire consequences. Not only would Mexico be to the United
States what Ireland was to Great Britain, but it would also exacerbate
domestic friction, presumably over slavery, beyond the point of no
return. 69

Nonetheless, both Senators gave confident appraisals of the

progress of the occupation
domination over Mexico. 70

by emphasizing America's

unmitigated

Despite the disasters that would befall the

68

Annexation would require extended occupation, since "such a government could not
stand without the perpetual guarantee of a standing army." American institutions were
also imperiled by such a course. "When the fires of virtuous patriotism that were kindled
on the altar of our country by the founders of the Republic shall have burnt down under
the ambitious lust of conquest, there will be no rebuking influence left to purify a n d
restrain lawless ambition." Congressional Globe 188, 189.
69
To Senator Calhoun, Ireland was "a source of heavy expense, a n d a burden," while to
Senator Pearce Ireland represented "a perpetual source of bloodshed, embarrassment,
annoyance, [and] endless disquietude." Congressional Globe 98, 175. Pearce also
warned ominously of overextension, that, "If w e go on this way enlarging our boundaries,
must w e not eventually be broken into fragments? The bonds which unite our country, if
stretched so far, must inevitably snap." Congressional Globe 176.
70
Senator Butler shamed supporters of the all Mexico movement, asking, should w e
"prosecute this war, devastate the country, sequester the revenues, disarm the
populace, reduce them to such a state that they c a n make no resistance, but must
a p p e a l to us, a n d ask to be annexed to our Confederacy?" Senator Pearce cited a
Latin saying, "'Parcere subjectis, debellare superbas?' Shall w e make war on the weak,
a n d not upon the strong? I fear w e have forgotten that maxim in our course towards
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United States as a result, annexing Mexico seemed like an attainable,
albeit highly undesirable, objective.
Fuller argues that public support for all Mexico had b e c o m e much
more conspicuous by this time, leading some Democrat Senators to subtly
revise their earlier positions.71 Several now cautiously tested the waters,
careful to present only a "hypothetical view of the compensating
advantages likely to arise from the annexation of Mexico," not a d v o c a t e
the d e e d itself.72

Among other economic and strategic gains, a

prolonged occupation would pave the w a y for the "political a n d social
regeneration" of the Mexican people, "uniting her to us" under "civilizing
and Americanizing influence." 73 Senator John Dix of New York described
the beneficial role that the occupation force would play:
As hostilities are now suspended, the chief province of the army
will be to maintain internal tranquility, support the civil authorities
in the execution of the laws, to free the country from the robber
and guerrilla bands by which it is infested, a n d subserve the great
purposes of government by affording security to liberty, property,
a n d life-a security the Mexicans have not fully enjoyed. The very
exercise of these beneficent agencies will tend to disarm the
hostility towards us with the thinking portion of the population. 74

Mexico, a n d trample upon her least able to resist us." Both passages offer a dim view of
Mexico's ability to resist subjugation. Congressional Globe 186, 175.
71
Fuller, "The Movement for the Acquisition of All Mexico," 103. Senator Cass, for
instance, w h o had earlier insisted that "no man in this nation" w a n t e d to annex Mexico,
now said that " w e may have to make the great experiment... and annex the domains of
Mexico to our own." Congressional Globe 54, 216.
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As for the rest of the population, Senator Henry Foote of Mississippi allayed
any concerns.75 He concurred that annexation was not only achievable
but beneficial, outlining the specific steps the occupation army would
take to successfully absorb Mexico into the United States as a stable and
prosperous territory.76

With rich resources and a mostly docile, if not

outright welcoming, population, annexation could not seem more
practicable!
Expansionist Senators clearly had administrative templates of a
dominated Mexico in mind.

At first glance, it might seem as if they

advocated a policy of incorporating Mexico into the Union.

The

redemption of backward Mexico was a prominent theme in their
speeches, but it was not necessarily a genuine goal. Philanthropy was a
convenient and noble justification for annexation, which, according to
historian Frederick Merk, rang true with Americans' understanding of
Manifest Destiny.77 However, judging from the potential economic and
strategic benefits that they cited, the Senators had no intention of lifting
Mexicans into equality with Americans. In listing these benefits, Senator
75

Indians, who comprised over fifty percent of the population by his estimate, were
"gentle in their manners, docile, obedient, orderly, and industrious in their habits." Peons,
who a c c o u n t e d for about ten percent of the population, were "a mixed race, slaves in
the most unfavorable sense of the word." The only group hostile to American goals, at
less than three percent of the population, was the "aristocratic party," while the
remainder were "the puros or democrats of Mexico, the friends of republican institutions,
always friendly to our people a n d government, a n d especially so in this war."
Congressional Globe 220.
™ Congressional Globe 219-221.
77
Of expansionists' rationalization, Merk writes, "Around the stark form of annexation, a
cover, pleasing in design, was draped. It was regeneration." Merk, Manifest Destiny and
Mission, 121.
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Foote ignored the Mexican people altogether, depicting Mexico as rich,
virgin land perfect for American settlers and entrepreneurs.78 Senator Dix
echoed his colleague's vision, confidently asserting, "Settlements will be
formed

within

the

unoccupied

and

sparsely-peopled

territory

of

Mexico."79 Such language invoked images of the American West, but
here it was being applied to the land south of the Rio Grande.80
Indeed, the idea of taking advantage of Mexican land under
American supervision sounded suspiciously like the administration of Indian
territory, under which Native Americans were displaced and their land
exploited by prospectors. That was a plan with which expansionists would
have been very familiar. The strategy was not very old, and the man
largely behind it, Senator Lewis Cass, still pursued an active political
career.81 Once the decision was made to annex Mexico, expansionist
Senators expected that the country would be absorbed neither as a
78

"There is ascertained to be an immense body of valuable land in Mexico, heretofore
unappropriated, there being, as I a m assured, from twenty-five to thirty millions of acres
of the richest lands in the world yet unoccupied in the State of Vera Cruz, and a
proportionate quantity in most of the States which have not yet b e c o m e densely
peopled. By bestowing farms of moderate extent upon actual settlers, the whole
country would soon b e c o m e occupied by a population equal to any under the sun."
Congressional Globe 220.
79
Congressional Globe 256.
80
"With such a territory and such a people on our southern border... [this] is to be the
inevitable course ot empire." Congressional Globe 256.
81
Cass b e c a m e Governor of Michigan Territory shortly after the War of 1812, a n d quickly
set about bringing this frontier more securely into the American fold. He was one of the
first Americans to vigorously pursue a policy of dispersing the natives a n d colonizing the
land. Although the contemporary perception of Michigan as a desolate a n d untamed
region initially deterred prospectors, Cass' efforts to draw settlers to the Territory gradually
bore fruit, at the expense of the native peoples. Cass' frontier strategy helped set the
policy precedent for future American westward expansion. See Andrew C. McLaughlin,
Lewis Cass (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin a n d Company, 1972), 95-99.
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colony nor as an integral part of the Union, but as virgin land along the
lines of freshly conquered Indian territory.
Senator Pearce, whose warning about overextension could be
interpreted as a concern that Mexico could not be held once taken,
came closest to outright challenging the American capacity for success.
However, his statement was more likely aimed at forecasting the split of
the North and South over domestic friction generated by slavery.

No

politician explicitly challenged America's ability to control and administer
Mexico.

Many implied that retaining a hold on the country would

generate immense costs and frustration, but emphasized the burden that
the United States would be shouldering rather than strictly challenge the
American capacity to pull it off. Indeed, this emphasis suggests that it was
their fear that Mexico's could be permanently dominated that led so
many Senators to passionately oppose any such action.

Conclusion
How the United States should proceed in its war against Mexico was
a divisive question that urgently needed to be answered in early 1848.
The President and some Senators made it clear that they wanted to
prosecute the war with redoubled effort, allegedly to pressure Mexicans
into seeking peace.

Other Senators vehemently opposed this course,

claiming it to be unnecessary or unjust.
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All the while, the all Mexico

movement was gaining momentum, leading several Senators to address
the prospects of annexation directly.

Yet throughout all the political

debate, no voice suggested that Mexico could not be held interminably.
President Polk explicitly stated that he did not seek annexation, but
points in his address cast no doubt that it was possible. Pursuing a course
of indefinite occupation indicated that he believed Mexico could be
subjugated for a long time.

Seeking to increase the pressure on a

population already showing signs of resistance was an especially bold
move, demonstrating his confidence in America's capacity to dominate
the Mexican populace.

Particularly if he accepted the optimistic

appraisals of his advisors. President Polk may well have considered
annexation to be feasible.
Congress

echoed

the

President's

confidence

in

American

capability. Democratic Senators who supported Polk's plan admitted that
the current garrison force might be insufficient to keep a grip on Mexico,
but they were certain that several more regiments could accomplish the
task. Those who believed that additional troops were unnecessary felt
that Mexican resistance was no threat. And Whig Senators who felt that
the war was unjust shamed their colleagues for letting defenseless Mexico
be laid prostrate by aggressive American arms.
emphasized America's ability to dominate Mexico.
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Each argument

When

Congress

discussed

annexation

directly,

the

debate

centered on the value of such a peace, not on whether or not it could be
achieved. Senators Dix and Foote clearly had no doubts that if the United
States d e c i d e d to annex Mexico, the country would submit to American
administration and become a beneficial addition to United States
territory.
worth.

Other Senators offered less sanguine appraisals of Mexico's
Opponents of annexation often based their arguments on

impressions of Mexican racial inferiority, predicting that Mexico would be
a burden a n d undermine American institutions. They a c c e p t e d that the
United States could dominate Mexico permanently, but insisted that
achieving that goal would be detrimental for the Union and its ideals.
No matter the stance that American politicians a d o p t e d toward
the w a y the war should be prosecuted, Mexico's fate appeared to be
entirely in American hands. Each position featured language that implied
American strength, Mexican weakness, or both.
perceptions,

American

politicians

held

no

Because of these

reservations

that

the

annexation of Mexico was achievable. This explains why the discussion of
feasibility was absent from the debate.
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CHAPTER II

PERCEPTIONS OF MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES IN AMERICAN
NEWSPAPERS DURING THE OCCUPATION, 1847-1848

Despite

having

overcome

Mexico's

army

and

occupied

its

prominent cities, in January of 1848 the United States remained at war
with a country seemingly unwilling to admit defeat. A few months earlier,
American politicians had disputed whether or not territorial demands
were appropriate p e a c e terms, but as the war dragged on many
Americans began to contemplate more drastic measures. Politicians now
d e b a t e d whether or not it was pragmatic to annex all Mexico. The New
York Herald, a Democratic-leaning publication, declared,
The longer duration of Mexico's nationality... is in the scale. If she
submits to terms of p e a c e a c c e p t a b l e to the United States, before
the period of our Presidential election, she may yet remain a
separate a n d independent nation-if she does not, her fate is sealed
forever, a n d the stars and strips [sic] will, of right, legally a n d
equitably take the place of the eagle a n d the snake. In nine
months, at most, Mexico will be Mexico still, or part of the United
States.82
Contemporary critics might challenge the author's assertion that
absorbing Mexico would be legal a n d equitable, but it was clear that the
longer the war lasted, the more momentum the all Mexico movement
gained.
82

There was a sense that if the American policy of occupation

"The Present - The Future - Mexico," The New York Herald, 26 January 1848, 2.
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persisted, the United States would inevitably a n d unavoidably annex
Mexico. While Congress d e b a t e d the expediency of the consequences
of staying the course, the idea that the United States did not have the
capability to annex Mexico remained conspicuously absent from the
dialogue.

Indeed, the urgency with which some Senators contested

Senator Cass' Ten Regiment Bill and President Polk's plan "to prosecute it
[the war] with increased energy a n d power," stemmed from worries that
America absolutely could annex Mexico, and that the integrity of
American institutions would subsequently suffer.83
American politicians did not challenge their country's ability to
annex Mexico because their understandings of America a n d Mexico
undermined the grounds on which to d o so. Each faction's arguments
relied upon Mexican and American stereotypes that had

become

entrenched among Americans over the course of the Mexican-American
War. Expansionists saw opportunities to be had in a rich land ripe for the
taking. Calhoun Democrats feared the consequences of incorporating
the large, "mixed race" of Mexico into the union. 84

Whigs portrayed

Mexicans as the helpless victims of American bullying.

Debates in

Washington D.C. offered glimpses of how politicians perceived Mexico
a n d the United States.

However, other sources offer a more complete

perspective.
83
84

See Chapter I. Sen. Exec. Doc. 14.
Congressional Globe 98.
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Many contemporary newspapers were unabashedly partisan.85
Their contents frequently indicated and elaborated on the political
positions ot the party that their editors supported. Not shy to display their
political affiliations, authors made no claim to be objective. Yet they did
claim to be reporting facts.86 As sources that strove to be authoritative,
periodicals both influenced and reflected common cultural perceptions
of the United States and Mexico. A portrait of Mexicans and Americans
emerged, which often transcended party lines and gave no reason to
doubt the ability of the United States to annex Mexico. Mexicans were
innocuous, uncivilized, and inferior, and thus posed little threat to
American plans.

Americans, by contrast, were powerful, enlightened,

and superior, and thus capable of monumental deeds.
This chapter provides a close reading of contemporary newspapers
because of their close connections to politics and their reflection of
85

Objectivity was a not a professed goal of the press until the twentieth century.
According to historian Richard Kaplan, "partisanship was a public and ubiquitous
phenomenon that defined the very essence of nineteenth-century American journalism."
Richard L. Kaplan, Politics and the American Press: The Rise of Objectivity, 1865-1920
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1. Some periodicals, like The Berkshire
County Whig of Pittsfield, Massachusetts, proudly announced their affiliation in their
names. Other newspapers carried articles that left no doubt about which party it
supported. For instance, a passage in The Daily Ohio Statesman read, "Democrats, you
have done your duty-the victory is yours, a n d now you stand before the world as the
noble defenders of correct principles-as vigilant sentinels upon the walls of your country."
"Victory!! - Democracy is Triumphant," The Daily Ohio Statesman (Columbus, OH), 14
October 1847, 2. For a detailed account of how party politics shaped the news media in
the United States during this era, see William E. Huntzicker, The Popular Press, 1833-1865
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 35-51.
86
One author began an article with a quotation from Dr. Franklin, '"Give me facts before
your c o m m o n sense.'" He went on to assert, "A writer on the present condition of Mexico
stakes more than his literary reputation on the result, for at every p a g e his veracity may
be questioned." Col. Albert C. Ramsey, "Field Notes. Statistics, Observations, a n d
Thoughts on the Civil Condition of Mexico," The New York Herald, 14 February 1848, 1.
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common perceptions.

Most articles were written between the fall of

Mexico City in September

1847, and the signing of the Treaty of

Guadalupe-Hidalgo in February 1848.
newspapers

from

the

Northeast,

They c a m e from twelve major

Mid-Atlantic,

West,

and

South. 87

However, the articles cited from this sample may also have reached
beyond these newspapers' readership, as they were often printed in
multiple publications. 88
The amount of material cited from e a c h source d e p e n d e d largely
on the topics e a c h focused on. The New York Herald, for example, was a
widely read newspaper that tightly e m b r a c e d the ideology Manifest
Destiny.

Its authors called for unrestrained expansion a n d frequently

juxtaposed the United States and Mexico, describing e a c h country's
characteristics a n d values to better demonstrate the importance of the
war and the conquests that would follow. As periodicals go, it provided
an unprecedented amount of relevant material.
Whig newspapers, by comparison, were less dedicated to providing
details on the relationship between Mexico and the United States.
87

The articles in this chapter c a m e from the following periodicals. Democrafic-leaning
newspapers: The New York Herald, The Daily Ohio Statesman (Columbus, OH), The Sun
(Baltimore, MD), The Macon Weekly Telegraph, The Morning News (New London, CT), The
Southern Patriot (Charleston, SC), and The Wisconsin Democrat (Madison, Wl). Whigleaning newspapers: The Berkshire Country Whig (Pittsfield, MA), The
Emancipator
(Boston, MA), The New Hampshire Sentinel (Keene, NH), The Semi-Weekly Eagle
(Brattleboro VT), and The Constitution (Middletown CT).
88
For example, pieces that originated from The Boston Whig, The National
Intelligencer,
The Philadelphia Ledger a n d The New Orleans Picayune, among others, turned up in the
newspapers I analyzed. Conversely, articles of national importance that d e b u t e d in
major publications like The New York Herald would be disseminated amongst other
papers.
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Occasionally an author would reveal some indication ot his perspective
when directly challenging a Democratic argument.

However, the

majority of articles concerning the conflict focused on the morality of the
war.

More pragmatic issues were not in doubt, but neither were they

Whigs' main concerns. As a result, the material cited from these sources is
more limited.

American Fortitude
In The New York Herald, a Democratic author exclaimed, "What a
great people w e are!" 89

This statement, which could be interpreted

several ways, perhaps best summed up the general understanding that
Americans had of the United States. Democrats principally used the word
great to imply integrity a n d nobility. They proudly emphasized American
glory, spirit, and values. Whigs also acknowledged American gallantry,
but were less apt to glorify the deeds of a belligerent nation.

Whig

sources generally treated great as meaning powerful, acknowledging the
military success of the United States.

Both interpretations implied that

American strength did not falter in the face of adversity.
This same theme of American fortitude could be identified in
political speeches when wartime success was being described. Politicians
89

The author made this statement because he was very impressed by America's
program to improve Mexican infrastructure during the occupation, specifically the plan
to build a railroad from Vera Cruz to Mexico City. "American and Mexican Affairs: Life in
Mexico," The New York Herald, 10 January 1848, 1.
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of both parties accepted the use of the rhetoric of military gallantry to
describe American victories on the battlefield.90 Similarly, authors of many
newspaper articles often employed the same language.
gallant

courage,

Words like

and heroic showed up frequently, particularly in

Democratic-leaning publications.91
In a time when there was a great deal of pressure to be patriotic,
this language was certainly in part a calculated, overt expression of
national pride. However, that did not necessarily mean it was considered
to be empty rhetoric.

The combats of 1846 and 1847 supported the

notion that American strength derived from something more than just
conventional military power. Were numbers alone the deciding factors,
the American army would have been foiled at every turn. Senator Cass
claimed that one of the "proudest trophies" of the war was a table
prepared by the Adjutant General's Office describing an uninterrupted
"series of successes" from 1846 through 1847. The details show that out of

90

See Chapter I. Democratic politicians extolled the valor of American soldiers with florid
language.
For instance, President Polk praised "the high proofs of courage,
consummate military skill, steady discipline, a n d humanity to the vanquished enemy,
exhibited by our gallant army." Sen. Exec. Doc. 5. Whigs, whose patriotism was being
questioned by Democrats, agreed with the moderate use of such language. For
example, many Whig Congressmen were willing to support a resolution thanking the
army for their "courage, skill, fortitude, and g o o d conduct," so long as long as that
resolution was not construed as an official sanction of the war. The Congressional Globe,
29 th Cong., 2 n d sess., vol. 16 (Washington D.C.: Blair a n d Rives, 1847), 295.
91
These words appear hundreds of times in 1847 editions of The Sun (Baltimore, MD), The
New York Herald, The Macon Weekly Telegraph, The Southern Patriot (Charleston, SC),
The Daily Ohio Statesman (Columbus, OH), a n d The Wisconsin Democrat (Madison, Wl),
in reference to the entire military, prominent officers, a n d individual fallen soldiers.
"America's
Historical
Newspapers,
1690-1922,"
Archive
of
Americana
<http://infoweb.newsbank.com> (15 March 2008).

45

twenty-eight battles, Americans were outnumbered in all but one: the
siege of Vera Cruz. During the average engagement there were three
Mexican soldados for every American soldier, yet Mexican forces suffered
three times the number of American casualties and greater mortality. 92
The statistics themselves were not entirely accurate, as the Adjutant
General freely admitted, and were surely cited by Senator Cass out of
political motivation. 93 Nonetheless, they did inform a n d reflect the story
being told in the United States.
Newspapers

carried

articles

citing

success

after

success.

Depending on their political affiliation, some lauded impressive victories,
while others simply summarized battles with little fanfare.

Take, for

instance, the various portrayals of the Battle of Chapultepec, an assault
on a fortress outside Mexico City in September 1847. As news of the battle
b e c a m e available, The New York Herald published a letter that described
it as an encounter with "a large force of the enemy's best troops, ...in
which the Mexicans received as usual a g o o d thrashing."

The author

highlighted that Americans had "fought like devils," and that their

92

See Figure 3 on page 64.
Referring to the table, Senator Cass confessed, "The Adjutant General remarks, that he
cannot vouch for the perfect accuracy of the above statements, as from their nature
they must often be estimated." There is no doubt that between the battlefield and the
Capitol, some of those estimates became exaggerated. Details aside, though, the table
accurately depicted the impressive battle record that the United States had developed
during its military operations in Mexico. Congressional Globe 87.
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casualties were reportedly light.94

An article from The New Orleans

Picayune, repeated in other major newspapers including that of Senator
Calhoun's home state, described the same assault as "another battle and
another... great American victory."95 Less sympathetic to the Democrats
was The Emancipator of Boston, which tucked news of the conflict inside
a piece emphasizing that the truce with Mexico was broken. The battle
was regarded as "a terrible fight," but the author acknowledged that a
small American band had prevailed over an impressive Mexican force.96
No matter the wording, these articles conveyed a sense of
accomplishment in the face of adversity.

One expansionist even

ventured that General Scott could set up his own empire at the behest of
the United States. "You may laugh at this proposition; but think over it,
and you will find it feasible.

Scott has the men of daring with him,

capable of any chivalrous achievement, and why should they not found
an empire! ...Posterity would accredit them as the greatest of heroes."97
It was particularly important to Democrats to emphasize that
American

gallantry

was

not

a

uniquely

wartime

phenomenon.

Newspapers printed speeches by officers who elaborated on this
deciding factor.

American soldiers who had rallied in the face of

94

"Highly Important Intelligence trom the City of Mexico," The New York Herald, 1
October 1847, 2.
95
"Important from the City of Mexico," The Southern Patriot 1 October 1847,2.
96
"Highly Important from Mexico," The Emancipator (Boston, MA), 6 October 1847,3.
97
"A Patent Peace Project," Morning News (New London, CT), 22 December 1847, 3.
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overwhelming odds reflected the indomitable American spirit.

Soldiers

best demonstrated the spirit through their impressive triumphs, but it was
innate in every g o o d citizen. 98

The United States derived its strength

through "the spirit and determination, union a n d energy of the American
people." 9 9
Wartime success had proven American military capability, but it
had further implications. The strength needed to defeat armies was easily
interpreted as the same strength needed to occupy a nation. Gallantry
on the battlefield translated to a broadly construed sense of power.
Particularly with the Democratic emphasis on an intangible American
spirit,

the

country's

encompassing.

strength

These

were

became
critical

understandings of their own country.

at

once

components

vague
to

and

all-

Americans'

Combined with the way enemy

resistance was described, Americans could hardly doubt that o c c u p i e d
Mexico would submit to American domination.

98

Gen. Shields declared that these battles had not been won through "military science...
It was the stout hearts and strong arms of American soldiers. ...The same spirit that
animates this meeting to-night is that which fought a n d conquered in the valley of
Mexico."
"Dinner to Generals Quitman a n d Shields," The National
Intelligencer
(Washington, D.C.), cited in The Sun (Baltimore, MD), 13 January 1848, 1.
99
"Capt. Reed's Speech—Another Withering Rebuke of the Treasonable Course of
Mexican Whigs in the United States," The Daily Ohio Statesman (Columbus, OH), 16
December 1847,2.
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Domination over Mexico
Having returned from the battlefields of Mexico near the end of the
war, Generals Quitman and Shields addressed an audience at a New
Orleans dinner party to celebrate the triumphs of American arms. But
before General Shields launched into his commendation of the soldiers,
he prefaced his speech by pointing out that Americans at home were
"much too accustomed to underrate [Mexicans]."100 He recognized that
vanquishing

a

weak

and

unworthy

enemy

hardly

glorified

the

achievements of the vanquishers. However, his implication that Mexicans
had been a threatening opponent may have been poorly received.
The common assumption in the United States was that Mexico was
unable to mount effective resistance. Among Democrats, it was popular
to portray Mexicans as innocuous in multiple ways. Whigs, meanwhile,
favored disputing the justness of the war over discussing the nature of the
Mexican people.

For them, the question was not whether or not the

United States could take over Mexico, but whether or not it should do
so.101 Yet significantly they did not challenge the claim that Mexico was
defenseless.
A primary criticism of the Mexican people was that they lacked
fighting spirit.

The Mexican government's refusal to back down and

100

"Dinner to Generals Quitman and Shields," The National Intelligencer (Washington,
D.C.), cited in The Sun (Baltimore, MD), 13 January 1848, 1.
i°' See Chapter I.
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accept peace with an army that had all but overrun its core provinces
was dismissed as mere egotism. What to Mexicans was a point of honor
was written off by Americans as "the obstinacy, the vanity, the pride,
[and] the self-conceit of the Spaniards in exaggeration."102 Mexican ego
was totally groundless, and Americans had nothing to fear.103

Colonel

Albert C. Ramsey assured the readers of his article that, in Mexico,
"patriotism and integrity were no more, its forms only observed... These
fine phrases have descended to them like the armor of Alvorado, to be
admired and exhibited to strangers, but... [useless] in a battle with our
troops."104
The apparent docility of the populace in territories under American
control seemed to be proof that Mexican national pride was empty
rhetoric. Mexicans ostensibly felt resigned to the American presence, and
life went on undisturbed.'05 According to an article distributed by The
American Star, the American newspaper established in Mexico City for
the occupying forces, many Mexicans had even become accustomed

to2 "What Is to Be Done?" The Philadelphia Ledger, cited in The Daily Ohio Statesman
(Columbus, OH) 14 October 1847, 2.
103
"The people of Mexico are infinitely less c a p a b l e of such energetic patriotism [than
Americans], a n d have few inducements to make the effort." "Interesting from the War
Quarter Affairs at Jalapa," The New York Herald, 3 January 1848, 1.
104
Col. Albert C. Ramsey, "Field Notes. Statistics, Observations, a n d Thoughts on the Civil
Condition of Mexico," The New York Herald, 14 February 1848, 1.
105
"The position of the people here is a singular one; it exhibits an anomaly, such as the
world never saw before. With their conquerors in the high seats of power, filling the
capital with the echo of their military parade, they move on their course of life, as if
nothing had occurred to disturb their serenity." "American a n d Mexican Affairs: Life in
Mexico," The New York Herald, 10 January 1848, 1.
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and attached to American control.106
articles

that

the

processes

through

Indeed, Americans read in some
which

Mexicans

"Yankeefied" or "Yankeeised" had already begun.' 07

would

be

That Mexicans

could be a threat was unthinkable when they were apparently
acclimating well to the occupation. The idea that Mexicans could and
had adjusted to the American presence reinforced the innocuous
Mexican image.
Visible signs of Mexicans who were alienated by the American
occupation were not treated seriously. For instance, when Texan units
garrisoned a town, their reputation for brutality strained the occupiers'
relationship with the locals. But rather than acknowledge this source of
tension, one author joked that when Mexican men stayed in doors for fear
of the Texans, it had "a salutary effect in one respect-that of making
many good husbands."108 Not all Mexicans reacted quite so submissively
106

"Los Yanquies are by no means such an eye-sore to the natives as they 'used to was,'
a n d w e verily believe that many of them would contemplate the idea of our departure
with feelings akin to sorrow." "Intelligence from the War Quarter Affairs in Mexico," The
American Star, cited in The New York Herald, 8 January 1848, 1.
107
Mexicans seemed quick to participate in American culture. One author wrote, "The
city, since it has been in possession of our troops, has been, in a measure, Americanized,
or rather Yankeefied." John H. Warland, Esq., No Title, New-Hampshire Sentinel (Keene,
NH), 23 December 1847, 1. Mexicans b e c a m e intimately familiar with Americans in other
ways, as well. "Officers of our army have thrown up their commissions and intermarried
with the Senoritas [sic], which will have the effect to Yankeeise them and produce a
Yankee population in time to come." Felix, "Affairs in Washington, Jan. 22, 1848," The
New York Herald, 25 January 1848, 4. Another author confidently asserted that
eventually "our laws and institutions, customs a n d manners [will] have taken firm root" in
occupied Mexico, because "there is no bond of union between them a n d their
government." "American a n d Mexican Affairs: Life in Mexico," The New York Herald, 10
January 1848,1.
108
"American and Mexican Affairs: Life in Mexico," The New York Herald, 10 January
1848,1.
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to the occupation, but even guerillas were belittled in the newspapers.
Rather than portray them as resisters or tighting men, guerillas were
labeled "rascals" whom the Americans would promptly defeat.109
It was a point of pride that the United States was benevolent to the
people they conquered, but even had General Scott established an
oppressive regime, some went so far as to suggest that it was simply
against Mexican nature to rise up and revolt. To Colonel Ramsay, the
people of Mexico had defied logic since their discovery by Europeans,
when they meekly submitted to the government and religion of a few
hundred armed Spaniards. Even in recent history, despite bankruptcy,
unpaid armies, and prevailing "dissension and discord," the populace
appeared neither to rebel nor to seek to reform the government.110 In the
wake of such history, that they would rise up now against the benign
occupiers of the United States was unthinkable.

109

One article describes the infamous guerilla leader himself as a "rascal." "Threatening
Position of Father Jarauta a n d his Guerillas," The New York Herald, 11 January 1848, 1. It
was America's obligation to purge Mexico of the "lazy" and the "rascals." "What Is to Be
Done?" The Philadelphia Ledger, cited in The Daily Ohio Statesman (Columbus, OH) 14
October 1847, 2. This would not be a problem, as "the guerrillas on every part of this line
are... most effectually cut up." "Interesting from the War Quarter Affairs at Jalapa," The
New York Herald, 3 January 1848, 1.
1,0
Mexico was an anomalous place where "armies mustering hundreds of thousands
have been routed by five hundred under Cortez; where a united and happy nation has
been subdued; ...where dissension and discord prevail without affecting the form of
government; where religion has been established by the sword; where anarchy... is
recognized as public law; and where the assertion that the worst of governments is
better than none, has found answer; where the nation is bankrupt without a political
dissolution, an army unpaid without revolt..." Col. Albert C. Ramsey, "Field Notes.
Statistics, Observations, and Thoughts on the Civil Condition of Mexico," The New York
Herald, 14 February 1848, 1.
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Whig politicians also m a d e Mexicans seem less threatening by
depicting them as helpless victims, but this motif was downplayed in Whigleaning periodicals. 111

Whig newspapers single-mindedly concentrated

on the injustice of the war in light of Christian values a n d standards for
civilized conduct on the international stage.

Nonetheless, when they

occasionally confronted Democratic contentions containing c o m m o n
perceptions of Mexico, Whig authors did not object to the stereotypes.
Observe what the writer took exception to when challenging this
argument put forward in The New York Evening Post:
'Now in this contest it appears to us very clear that the
incompetency a n d utter inability of Mexico to maintain an
independent existence-a decent existence as an independent
power-have been m a d e most manifestly apparent.' Could not
Bonaparte have said the same after visiting the little republic of St.
Marino? But did he therefore extinguish it? 112
The Whig author challenged the sufficiency of the Democrat's justification
for annexation. He did not deny this scathing interpretation of Mexico;
indeed, his statement could even be construed as likening Mexico's
defense capability to that of St. Marino. But for him, Mexican failings did
not justify annexation.
Periodicals demonstrated a strong conviction that Mexico was no
threat

to

the

occupation, which, if true, had

obvious,

practical

implications about the feasibility of American designs in that country.

' " S e e Chapter I.
No Title, Berkshire County Whig (Pittsfield, MA), 6 January 1848, 2.

1,2
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Indeed, they fixed American perceptions to regard Mexico as incapable
of resistance. In contrast to the gallantry exhibited by American soldiers,
Mexican behavior seemed like a dramatic counterpoint. American spirit
came across as stronger. And trivializing present tensions between the
occupiers and the Mexican populace set a precedent of downplaying
opposition, causing this gap in gallantry to be impossible to bridge.
America seemed capable of exercising its will over Mexico for as long as it
occupied the country.

American Superiority
In addition to the battlefield news and political commentary that
exhibited evidence of American gallantry and Mexican weakness,
periodicals published articles that gave Americans a better understanding
of the people with whom they were engaged in war.

The popular

perception, which Congressmen were not shy about expressing, was that
Mexicans

could

best be characterized

as a

people

inferior

to

Americans.1'3 Such an image held great bearing on American capability
in Mexico.

Newspapers advanced this conviction by emphasizing the

disparity in civilized behavior between the two cultures, and by stating
quite bluntly that Americans were, in fact, superior.

1,3

See Chapter I.
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The obvious dissimilarities between the United States and Mexico
were a subject of fascination and an inspiration to many authors.
According to one writer, "That country is so strange in all things, that
whatever is correctly written concerning it, must be equally so, and no less
true. If it bore any resemblance to our own happy country, my pencil
would neither attempt to pourtray [sic] any peculiarity of its features, nor
any portion of its picture."114
A number of authors wrote about these peculiarities to illustrate the
cultural background of the people whose country the United States
occupied.

Some avoided judgment, though the facts themselves

suggested a lack of sophistication. An article elaborating on the leperos,
the urban poor of Mexico, did not suggest that these people were
indicative of Mexican society as a whole; they were actually equated
with counterparts in Italy and the United States. However, their number,
"excesses," and "brutal and ignorant character" certainly cast aspersions
on Mexican society.115
Nor did all authors make any effort to be tactful. The Berkshire
County Whig and The New York Herald both ran articles depicting how
Mexican milk sellers took their livestock door to door, milking them to
order.

The Whig article treated the custom as interesting trivia and

1,4

Col. Albert C. Ramsey, "Field Notes. Statistics, Observations, a n d Thoughts on the Civil
Condition of Mexico," The New York Herald, 14 February 1848, 1.
115
"The Leperos," The Semi-Weekly Eagle (Brattleboro, VT), 26 October 1847, 3.
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allowed the facts to speak for themselves, subtly reinforcing the image of
Mexico as a primitive culture.116

But the author of the Herald piece

presumed that this practice was done for fear of theft, and he proceeded
to condemn the "natural villany [sic] of the people and their distrust of
each other."1 !7
This emphasis on difference naturally compelled Americans to
compare the two cultures.118 When they looked to periodicals as sources,
they based their comparisons on evidence that could engender only one
logical conclusion. Newspaper articles reflected common stereotypes of
an uncivilized Mexico and an enlightened United States, so one could
only conclude that America was a superior nation.
Some authors insinuated that Mexican culture was primitive and
unsophisticated, but others were far more direct. The "ignorant, besotted
and abject race" of Mexico was a prime target of merciless criticism.119
An author for the Berkshire County Whig likened Mexicans to the
"ignorant... Tartars" of Russia.120

In The New York Herald, the language

116

Particularly in light of spectacular American innovations in steam-driven
transportation. No Title, The Berkshire County Whig (Pittsfield MA), 3 February 1848,2.
" 7 "Interesting from the War Quarter Affairs at Jalapa," The New York Herald, 3 January
1848,1.
118
Doing so was an ordinary reaction. "How often... have I contrasted the condition of
the half-clad and wretched looking tenants of the thatched and mud-built huts, ...with
that of the farmers of New England. Heavens! What a difference!" John H. Warland,
Esq., No Title, The New Hampshire Sentinel (Keene, NH), 23 December 1847, 1.
" 9 John H Warland, Esq., No Title, The New Hampshire Sentinel (Keene, NH), 23 December
1847, 1. "We may impeach a n d disparage the Mexicans as w e will..." No title, Berkshire
County Whig (Pittsfield, MA), 3 February 1848, 2.
,2
° No title, Berkshire County Whig (Pittsfield, MA), 3 February 1848, 2.
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used to depict the Mexican reaction to Americans sounded not unlike the
first exposure of a tribe deep in Africa to Europeans.121
Religion, as well as race, was also a regular subject of reproach.
Irish and South German immigration

had

amplified

Anti-Catholic

sentiment in American society at this time. Those who held the Catholic
faith were regularly construed as ignorant, while the church itself was
considered corrupt and decadent. 122

Such attitudes were naturally

echoed in the discussion of Mexico.

Authors frequently condemned

Mexican Catholicism as corrupt.123 Some viewed the people as inherently
prone to vice and thus equally at fault.124 At worst, Mexican piety was
considered to be so perverted as to qualify as Christianity only in name.125
Conversely, the United States was described as a paragon among
nations. The American Star reminded its readers,
We should, one and all, regard ourselves as being, to a certain
extent, representatives of free institutions and of an enlightened
121

"The Mexicans believe them [Texas Rangers] to be a sort of semi-civilized, half-man,
half-devil, with a slight mixture of the lion and snapping-turtle, and have a more holy
horror of them than they have of the evil saint himself." "Interesting from the War Quarter
Affairs at Jalapa," The New York Herald, 3 January 1848, 1. The situation brought on by
the American army was "no less astonishing to their unsophisticated minds than fire arms
a n d wild horses were to their forefathers in the days of Montezuma." Mexicans are
labeled a "semi-civilized race" in this article as well. Col. Albert C. Ramsey, "Field Notes.
Statistics, Observations, a n d Thoughts on the Civil Condition of Mexico," The New York
Herald, 14 February 1848, 1.
122
Pinheiro, "Religion without Restriction," 73-74.
123
Mexicans were a superstitious and despondent people under an immoral a n d corrupt
church. Col. Albert C. Ramsey, "Field Notes. Statistics, Observations, and Thoughts on
the Civil Condition of Mexico," The New York Herald, 14 February 1848,1.
124
"The well known Mexican character... [involved] all of the vices and none of the
virtues of the Spaniards." "What Is to Be Done?" The Philadelphia Ledger, cited in The
Daily Ohio Statesman (Columbus, OH) 14 October 1847, 2.
125
Mexicans were described as a "half-civilized a n d semi-christian people." "Highly
Important-Settlement of the Mexican Question," The New York Herald, 8 February 1848, 2.
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republicanism, a n d endeavor to teach, by the force of example, to
our enemies, those sound principles of religion, humanity and
justice, which have gained for our country the high position which it
occupies amonst [sic] the most prosperous and civilized nations.126
The United States was said to boast remarkable enterprise, energy, a n d
"some of the best and purest forms of Christianity [sic]." 127

Some

disagreed that the conduct of the United States was living up to those
lofty ideals, but newspapers universally demonstrated pride for their
bastion of "Christian civilization." 128
An observer who read these descriptions and sought to describe
the relationship between the two cultures would presumably d e d u c e that
the United States was superior to Mexico.

But in case there were any

readers who had not yet m a d e this connection, articles sympathetic to
the major political factions pointed the relationship out specifically. The
subject was broached in dialogue about the value of annexing of
Mexico, and in arguments against Democratic stances.
A number of expansionists expounded on the merits of annexing
Mexico, which were based on a fundamental
superiority.

belief in American

From a financial perspective, pragmatists pointed out the

economic boost that would ensue when "the whole of that ignorant a n d
malignant people [would] be set to work, in a proper way, under North
126

"Intelligence from the War Quarter Affairs in Mexico," The American Star, cited in The
New York Herald, 8 January 1848, 1.
127
"Highly Important-Settlement of the Mexican Question," The New York Herald, 8
February 1848,2.
128
"The Progress of Christian Civilization," The Boston Whig, cited in The Emancipator
(Boston, MA), 12 May 1847, 2.
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American superintendence."129

From a humanitarian

perspective,

philanthropists insisted that it was America's duty to retain the country,
because "Civilization, Christianity [sic], protest against this reflux of the
[Mexican] tide of barbarism and anarchy."130 Annexation would thus lift
Mexico out of the economic and cultural darkness and transform the
nation into a functioning, profitable participant in the civilized world,
under America's wing.131
Many who disputed the supposedly intrinsic value of annexing
Mexico did so even though they, too, prided themselves on American
superiority and held contempt for Mexican inferiority. The disagreement
arose because greater emphasis was placed on the latter aspect. They
saw Mexican society as so deeply corrupt that it could not possibly be
redeemed, and worried about its power to subvert the United States.132
One author echoed a concern of Senator Calhoun, writing, "If we annex
ten millions of Mexicans to the population of our Republic, thus giving
them the power to shape, by their tawny Representatives in our National
129

"Rumors of Peace with Mexico," The New York Herald, 22 January 1848, 2.
130 No Tjt|6/ 7h e New York Evening Post, cited in Berkshire County Whig, 6 January 1848, 2.
131
"Since that country [Mexico] b e c a m e independent, it has shown nothing but
symptoms of returning barbarism, anarchy, and a gross savage state. The American
conquest, with all the lights and improvements, both religious and scientific, of the
present a g e , will communicate to the Mexican people a new energy a n d a new life,
which in twenty years will change the nature of the country, and assimilate its people to
a christian [sic] and enlightened age." "Highly Important-Settlement of the Mexican
Question," The New York Herald, 8 February 1848, 2.
132
"It is now the fashion, when speaking of the final annexation of Mexico, to descant
upon the blessings to be conferred upon her, by raising her from the depths of
degradation and ignorance to an equality with ourselves in civilization... This is all wrong
a n d unwise, because it is wrong." Galviensis, "Mr. Baldwin's Resolution - The Territorial
Question - News from Mexico," The New York Herald, 27 January 1848, 4.
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Legislature, the policy of our country, will it be the most proper to say that
w e have conquered Mexico,-or that we have
her?" 133

been

conquered

by

It was not worth risking the preservation of great American

institutions and values by exposing them to the benighted Mexican
people.
And, once again, Whig authors overtly avoided challenging such
common perceptions when disputing Democratic stances.

Disagreeing

with the contention that Mexican inferiority partly justified the war, one
author wrote, "We do not care whether the inhabitants of Mexico are
Spanish or Hottentots, whether they are white or black; one thing only w e
wish to know, and that is-has the United States acknowledged the
nationality

of Mexico?" 134 In other words, as far as he was concerned,

racial status held no bearing on the right to self-rule.

Another author

openly a c c e p t e d the idea of Mexican inferiority and incorporated it into
his argument, warning the United States to "flee from Mexico for our
salvation, as Lot did from Sodom," lest this country descend into the same
"mongrel, barbarous state." 135
Given the way differences

between American a n d

Mexican

culture, both factual a n d perceived, were characterized, Americans
inevitably d e c i d e d that their society was significantly superior. Of course,
133

No title, Louisville Journal, cited in The New Hampshire Sentinel (Keene, NH), 2
December 1847, 2.
' 34 "Mexican Aborigines," The Constitution (Middletown, CT) 5 January 1848, 2.
135
No Title, Berkshire County Whig (Pittsfield, MA), 6 January 1848.
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opinions about

Mexican vice and

barbarity a n d

about

American

sophistication only directly commented on culture. Alone, e a c h had no
bearing on countries' power and capability. However, once the unequal
relationship between the two countries was established regarding culture,
it had implications across the board. If America was greater than Mexico
in one realm, why not so in another?

Battlefield successes and the

progress of the occupation already seemed to verify that the American
spirit was stronger than that of its enemy. Each confirmation of American
superiority did much to bolster confidence in any American endeavor
against Mexico, including the question of whether annexation of its
extensive

territories

was

something

that

the

United

States

could

accomplish.

Conclusion
Through newspaper articles, common perceptions about the United
States a n d Mexico b e c a m e evident, which gave g o o d cause to be
confident about America's capabilities in that country. Americans were
depicted as civilized, spirited, and strong people. They c a m e across as a
vivid counterpoint to the allegedly weak, unsophisticated, a n d inferior
Mexican populace.
American fortitude was seen as beyond doubt.

The c o m b a t

record, which was regularly covered in the media, spoke for itself.
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However, the extent of American strength was not necessarily limited to
conventional warfare.

The rhetoric of gallantry and spirit espoused by

some newspapers particularly enforced the ubiquity of American power,
which might be harnessed to accomplish even the most difficult tasks.
Mexico, by comparison, seemed like innocuous or corrupt.

Even

Whigs, who condemned the plight of the Mexican people by American
arms, did not contest that Mexico was powerless. The government
exhibited unparalleled ego in its refusal to a c c e p t a p e a c e , but the
Mexican people appeared to be becoming resigned to the occupation.
Indeed, Mexican history seemed to indicate that the population was
inherently docile, even when under extreme duress. Those who did resist
were hardly relevant threats, so the prospects for indefinite occupation
seemed positive.
Apparent American cultural superiority confirmed yet another w a y
in which the United States trumped its southern neighbor.

Whether by

insinuating that the United States was more civilized than Mexico, or by
actually coming out and saying it, newspaper articles left no question as
to which society was superior.

Although this conclusion had no direct

implications on American capabilities, when considered in conjunction
with apparent American power a n d Mexican weakness, it indicated that
American

superiority might

be

true across the board.
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This, too,

contributed to a broad understanding of American power and its
capabilities toward Mexico.
As partisan sources, newspapers reflected the content

and

structure of contemporary political stances. The perceptions of American
strength and Mexican weakness, evidenced in periodicals, informed the
positions that American politicians took, and were often fundamental to
those positions. People who accepted these portrayals had every reason
to believe that Mexico's fate was in America's hands, which explains why
politicians did not challenge the feasibility of annexing Mexico.
Yet the contents of newspaper articles held ramifications for more
than just Washington politics.

The perceptions outlined in periodicals

reached far beyond the political sphere. Newspapers were in touch with
American society, as sources that both reflected and influenced popular
ideas. Therefore, ideas that engendered confidence in America's ability
to permanently dominate Mexico were spread across the country.
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FIGURE 3:
This is the table of battle statistics prepared for the Senate by the Adjutant
General. Senator Cass had good reason to be proud of the information
depicted here. Despite regularly facing a more numerous foe, victory
never escaped the American grasp. Such spectacular military success
was a central part of the contemporary American understanding of the
war.
Congressional Globe 87.
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CHAPTER III

AMERICAN SOLDIERS' PERCEPTIONS AND THE OCCUPATION OF MEXICO

Once Mexico City was in American hands and the military settled to
the task of maintaining the occupation, one author asserted, "They have
run over Mexico without overcoming it - They have seized a territory which
they cannot keep, and charged themselves with the responsibility of a
government which can offer them neither profit or [sic] advantage. They
have not acquired a nation by conquering a territory."' 36

Some may

have found this argument compelling where the article was originally
published, in England. 137 But this sobering interpretation of the limitations
of the American occupation found little sympathy west of the Atlantic. As
the earlier chapters have shown, commonly held stereotypes about
Mexico a n d the United States m a d e a convincing case that Mexico could
be dominated, for better or for worse.
As testament to how entrenched this sentiment was in American
society, it was held not only by those distanced from the war, but also by
the fighting men who participated in the occupation. Sometimes in the

136

"The Entente Cordiale—The Policy of Europe—The Position of the United States," The
Liverpool Mercury, cited in The New York Herald, 13 November 1847, 1.
,37
This article may also have been wishful thinking. As mentioned in Chapter I, the British
were resigned to the American domination of Mexico.
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face of compelling evidence fo the contrary, many soldiers confirmed
Mexico to be a corrupt state primarily comprised of poor, apathetic
people who readily submitted to any authority, and who a c c e p t e d the
United States as an outstanding country whose civilized, masculine people
could achieve great feats and overcome almost any obstacle.

They

often applied this knowledge to show that the occupation of Mexico was
quite successful, and potentially practicable in the long term.

Their

writings gave little cause to doubt the feasibility of annexing the country.
Of course most soldiers did not concern themselves with the exact
outcome of victory, so long as the honor a n d dignity of the United States
were satisfied. The diaries, journals, letters, anecdotes, a n d memoirs that
they left behind remind us that American soldiers were fighters, patriots,
and at times tourists, but rarely politicians.

They focused on the

sensational and the unique, writing about battles, heroics, sights in an
exotic environment, a n d the culture of an alien people. Their musings,
based on real a n d invented notions of Mexican a n d American societies,
do not shed light on all of the factors that would play a part in annexing
Mexico, but they d o suggest that the territory would be advantageous,
the population would not react negatively, a n d American gallantry a n d
ingenuity would help carry the day.
This chapter makes use of twenty sources written by soldiers in the
American army who campaigned in places that were not annexed but
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stood to be if the all Mexico movement had succeeded.138 The sample
consists of men who came from different backgrounds and who
occupied different positions in the army.139 However, the sources reveal
remarkably common perceptions of Mexico and American capability,
regardless of each soldier's circumstances.
The one exception was disagreement over the contribution of the
volunteers to the occupation. A great deal of tension existed between
volunteers and regulars. The government saw the need to supplement
the small regular army with volunteers, but professional soldiers largely did
not.

Volunteers were detested for rejecting military discipline, being

rowdy and stealing battlefield glory.140

But there was no love lost.

Volunteers saw the military establishment as undemocratic, if not
tyrannical, and the professional "who follows it for a livelihood, in peace
and war, in garrison and in camp, has need for only so much brains as will
138

Figure 4 on p a g e TOO is a map of American operations in Mexico in 1847 a n d 1848.
The largest American force of the war was under General Scott during his drive on
Mexico City. While a few of the soldiers cited were involved in the earlier campaigns
under General Taylor, most participated in the march along the Comino Real in the core
of Mexico. Figure 5 on p a g e 101 outlines Scott's route in detail.
139
Soldiers cited include volunteers a n d regulars, a full range of officers a n d recruits, and
Americans from across the country. Other historians have written on the relations
between these groups a n d how they shaped unique experiences within the army. For
more information on the backgrounds of soldiers who participated in the MexicanAmerican War, see James M. McCaffrey, Army of Manifest Destiny (New York: New York
University Press, 1992.), 28-34. For detailed analyses of the American soldier's experience
in the Mexican-American War, see McCaffrey 80-105 and Richard Bruce Winders, Mr.
Polk's Army (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1997), 50-87.
HO "| have no commiseration for the insubordinate rascals."
Napoleon Jackson
Tecumseh Dana, Monterrey Is Ours! e d . Robert Ferrell (Lexington, KY: The University Press
of Kentucky, 1990), 87. "If the Vols, were at home w e could so govern our soldiers as to
check outrages now hourly committed." Anderson 112. Flush with victory, Smith was
thankful that no volunteers were there to steal the regulars' glory. E. Kirby Smith, To
Mexico with Scott (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1917), 53.
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enable him to stand erect, keep his clothing and tent clean and neat,
and his arms bright."'41

Their accusations of one another during the

invasion must therefore be taken with a grain of salt.

Logistics

Before attempting to 'win the hearts and minds' of the locals and
other cliche tasks that befall an army of occupation, strategists first must
face the challenge of fielding and maintaining a large number of soldiers
across a foreign country. Success or failure hinges on two main factors at
this most basic level. The army must establish control over areas from
where it can oversee the population, and it needs to keep the soldiers
supplied and in good spirits. When writing about marches and the cities
they occupied, soldiers showed that Mexico was a favorable environment
for achieving these goals.
Large American armies marched in force across two different
regions in Mexico during the war: the northern states of Coahuila and
Tamaulpas including the important cities Monterrey and Tampico, and
the Camino Real from Vera Cruz to Mexico City. Both areas were difficult
landscapes for an army to travel through, and staying supplied was
critical. Officers who mentioned the quartermaster department in their
141

"Suffered from Tyranny pracficed, had the right of American soldiers trampled on by
their own officers." Thomas D. Tennery, The Mexican War Diary of Thomas D. Tennery
(Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), 94. George C. Furber, The Twelve
Months Volunteer (Cincinnati: J. A. & U. P. James, 1849), 433.
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accounts were disappointed by its inefficiency, and the army had to look
to locals to procure provisions.142

Fortunately for the Americans,

according to those concerned about supplies, goods were abundant
and trading was quite successful in both regions, providing both Taylor's
and Scott's large forces with ample supplies to march the hefty distances
from city to city.143

If Mexicans hesitated to trade with the invaders.

United States forces could and did exercise coercion to persuade them
otherwise.144

When soldiers suggested that troop movements on an

invasion scale could be adequately supplied and executed, movements
on a smaller occupation scale seemed quite feasible.
In an occupation, the need to travel and spread out across Mexico
could be avoided because of the way soldiers understood the country to
be organized. Several noted that Mexico was sparsely populated and
that most Mexicans lived in cities, claims backed up by common
142

The Quartermaster's Dept. was "woefully c o n d u c t e d . " George B. McClellan, The
Mexican War Diary of General George 8. McClellan e d . William Starr Myers (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1917), 19. Quartermasters failed to procure even basic
traveling gear. Taylor 39-40.
H3 "We procured full loads for our entire train at two plantations, which could easily have
furnished as much more." Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, vol. 1 (New
York: Charles L. Webster & Company, 1885), 137.
Quartermasters obtained a thousand bushels of corn from locals. Dana 114. "The
country people supplied us with
poultry, vegetables, and fruit." Dabney Herndon Maury, Recollections of a Virginian in
the Mexican, Indian, and Civil Wars (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1894), 130. "So far
w e have been able to secure at high prices an
a b u n d a n c e of grain, flour, beef, mutton, fresh pork, some coffee, sugar and salt, with
common tallow candles, so that the army c a n be tolerably well provisioned without
transporting supplies from the seaboard." Smith 154.
144 "We make them bring their produce and pay them a fair price for it." Dana 120. "Our
paying the Mexicans liberally for what they bring will induce them to c o m e , our punishing
those who prevent them, will show them that w e know and feel our strength, a n d that it
will be exerted when necessity demands it." Anderson 62.
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descriptions of empty countryside and bustling towns.145 Mountain passes
in both areas of operation made Private Samuel Chamberlain write that
"Mexico is made for picket duty."146 The implication of these observations
was that Mexico could be controlled from key cities and strategic
points.147 In outlining his plan for occupation while waiting for peace,
General Scott put the idea into words.

"Many of the States of this

republic, on account of their remoteness from the common centre,
sparseness of population, and inability to pay more than a trifle in the way
of contributions, are not worth being occupied. Their influence on the
question of peace or war is, proportionally, inconsiderable."148
The logistics of maintaining garrisons in these cities seemed, from
soldiers' accounts, practical. Like early travel writers, they depicted the
town and its environs, giving some idea about the supply situation they
faced. In contrast to the stark countryside, Americans were impressed
with the fertile, cultivated land around populated areas.149 The fruits of

145

"The population was sparse." Scott 552. "Mexico sustains nearly her entire population
in the towns a n d cities." C. Donnavan, Adventures in Mexico (Boston: George R.
Holbrook & Co., 1848), 49.
146
Samuel E. Chamberlain, My Confession e d . Roger Buttertield (New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1956), 98.
147
Rather than "overrun the whole country, garrison every state capital, a n d take every
considerable city," "the only practicable alternative" for controlling Mexico was to
"occupy the line, or certain points in it; a n d also to hold, not only the line a n d the ports,
but this capital, preserving an open communication with the gulf." Letter from Major
General Quitman, 15 October 1847, General Scott and His Staff 103. Grant listed cities
occupied by American forces that a c t e d as points of control. Grant 171.
148
Scott 565.
149
Camargo was "in the midst of a fertile country." Tennery 32. Crops grew around
Monterrey "in luxuriance a n d abundance." Smith 69. Tampico surroundings were a
"garden spot." Furber 390. Around Perote, "Vast fields of maize" were "fertile a n d well
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these surroundings could be purchased in any season at busy local
markets.150 In every major city Americans passed through during the war,
the size of these markets and the variety and abundance ot goods being
sold impressed all of the soldiers who wrote of them.151

One soldier

succinctly recorded that throughout the campaign the army "found
supplies of all descriptions" with "comparative ease."152
Soldiers reported that Mexican cities occupied by the Americans
provided amenities as well as goods, keeping the occupying forces

cultivated." William Preston, Journal in Mexico (Privately printed, n.d.), 20. "In, a n d
around Jalapa everything is beautiful - really wonderfully beautiful! There c a n be no
other place on earth more nearly approaching Paradise." Francis Collins, Journal of
Francis Collins e d . Maria Clinton Collins (Cincinatti: The Abbington Press, 1915), 64.
Puebla's surroundings were a "land of plenfy." Anderson 148.
150
Markets had "an everlasting stock range lasting all summer and winter." Tennery 32.
151
At the market in Matamoros, "beef, mutton, eggs, a n d many c o m m o n article were in
abundance." Samuel Ryan Curtis, Mexico Under Fire e d . Joseph E. Chance (Fort Worth,
TX: Texas Christian University Press, 1994), 28. At Matamoros, Mexicans e n g a g e d in
"considerable marketing." Dana 82. Camargo's market had many different crops "in
abundance." Tennery 32. "We have exposed in the markets here [Monterrey] the fruits
a n d productions here of all climes." Smith 69. At Tampico, "the market is very good-an
abundant supply of everything, a n d at very reasonable rates." Later he took his wife on
a virtual walk, describing the market's a b u n d a n c e in great detail. Anderson 14, 59-62.
Furber, too, was compelled to give a virtual tour of the bustling marketplace at Tampico,
providing an exhaustive list of the variety of foods sold. Furber 405. Tampico's market,
"like all Mexican markets, presents a very busy a n d animated picture; g a m e , fish, fruit,
a n d vegetables were the principal commodities in the market... and these were all
remarkably cheap..." Autobiography
of an English Soldier in the United States Army
(New York: Stringer & Townsend, 1853), 134. Despite the blockade of Mexican ports, the
market at Zacatecas remained "well supplied with every variety of foreign goods."
Donnavan 54. Anderson could obtain ample goods from Vera Cruz, although the
lengthy siege had driven up prices significantly. Anderson 119. Marketers in Jalapa
traded many types of goods in the large plaza at the center of town. Autobiography of
an English Soldier 210. Jalapa's market sold a wide range of goods from all climate
zones. Furber 606-7. Amazoque's market featured a "great variety" of goods. Smith 162.
Anderson found Puebla's "marketing abundant a n d reasonable," and described the
market scene thoroughly. Anderson 178, 203-5. Puebla's market was "admirable,"
according to Smith, who asserted that "anything c a n be obtained here for money."
Smith 168. Commodities of all sorts could be found in the markets at the City of Mexico,
where "the supply is most abundant." Autobiography of an English Soldier 275.
152
Autobiography of an English Soldier 211.
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happy. "Here we were furnished with every comfort, every convenience,
that soldiers in a foreign land could expect or ask for," wrote a soldier
during his stay in Tampico.153 Festivities like fandangos were frequent and
popular events among the men, although officers often disapproved of
the revelry that ensued.154

Both local theaters and newly established

American theaters catered to large audiences in major Mexican cities.155
Soldiers stationed in Mexico City could even frequent the nearby "resort
town" of St. Augustine.156 George McClellan, better known for his exploits
in the Civil War, wrote that in Tampico he spent "some of the happiest
hours of my life."157 Even during wartime, in a place far away from home,
soldiers who participated in the occupation could relax and enjoy
themselves, ostensibly decreasing the risk of desertion and facilitating a
lengthy occupation.

'53 Furber 393.
154
"The Fandango was all fun a n d frolic... [and w e were] all pretty well intoxicated with
love a n d liquor." Chamberlain 45. A fandango had no quality entertainment, a n d was
just an excuse for lots of people to gather and revel. Donnavan 17. Fandangos "have
but one object in view, a n d that enjoyment." L. A. Norton, Life and Adventures of Col. L
A. Norton (Oakland, CA: Pacific Press Publishing House, 1887), 115. Officers instead went
to "respectable balls," though like enlisted men at fandangos, some " m a d e a regular
frolic of it... a n d all got high." Dana 179.
155
At Tampico were " a company of American actors, e n g a g e d in carrying on the
'American Theatre;' and pretty well they do also, a n d obtain e a c h night c r o w d e d
houses." Furber 413. "A company of theatrical performers, w h o had been with General
Taylor s army in Monterey [sic] a n d Matamoras, [had]... officers and soldiers crowding
the theatre every night to overflowing." Autobiography of an English Soldier 140. "What
do you think of an American Theatrical Company opening in the City of Puebla!!"
Anderson 202. The Teatro de Santa Anna in Mexico City b e c a m e the National Theatre
a n d drew large American audiences. J. M. Wynkoop ed., Anecdotes and Incidents
(Pittsburgh, 1848), 19.
156 Collins 91.
'57 McClellan 51.
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Soldiers' portrayals of logistics were both expressions of American
confidence and justifiable conclusions derived from experiences a n d
insight. On one hand, given the concentration of population, the cities
that American forces occupied probably were effective control nexuses
that allowed American forces to oversee strategically important regions.
Most Americans' descriptions of markets and amenities may have only
partially described the supply situation, omitting issues of supply lines,
military equipment, manpower

and desertion, but these were

the

concerns of strategists, not ordinary soldiers. On the other hand, it is telling
that soldiers did not worry about the logistics of occupying Mexico, which
to the layman might seem to be a monumental task. There is no question
that their portrayal of logistics played into the overall positive analysis of
the occupation.

The Mexican Response to Occupation
Captain Anderson warned of a potential obstacle to occupying
Mexico in a letter to his wife.

He wrote that if the Mexican people

b e c a m e incensed at the American presence, "hence would result an
enthusiasm which would render the country unconquerable. Every City
a n d Town might then fall before the force of our Arms, a n d still w e would
meet with enemies in every mountain recess, and behind every burn." He
went on to explain that this would not happen due to the beneficent
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occupation policies of the United States.158 Nonetheless, by just admitting
the possibility of Mexican unrest, Anderson demonstrated superior insight
over many of his peers. Unlike most Americans, Anderson had traveled in
Latin America before and was less apt to accept common stereotypes
about the people.159

Most American soldiers believed that Mexicans

were a cowardly, lazy race, and sometimes depicted them as less than
human. It followed that such a people would not react aggressively to
occupation, and that was indeed how locals were portrayed as
American forces marched into Mexican cities.
It is not astonishing that Mexico and the United States did not have
a friendly cultural exchange in the middle of hostilities. However, wartime
animosity only partly fueled a stereotype which drew on deep racial and
religious divides between Anglo-Saxons and mestizos. On the battlefield,
Mexican soldiers were seen as inferior to and less masculine than their
opponents from the north.160 They were not even "half the men the
American soldiers are," one soldier proclaimed to his wife.161 Battle after
battle, American forces racked up victories despite usually facing a

158

Anderson 24.
Captain Anderson mentioned in passing having witnessed holiday ceremonies in
Bogota before the war. Anderson 197.
160
"Cowardly as they [Mexicans] universally are..." Donnavan 24. Mexican soldiers were
"poor miserable cowards." Dana 128. A battle loomed a h e a d , "but w e had strong
ground for hope in the positive cowardice of the Mexicans, our own comparative
courage, a n d the superior skill of General Scott." "The Mexican lancers exhibited most
characteristically both their cowardice a n d cruelty of disposition." Autobiography of an
English Soldier 185, 258.
'«' Dana 129.
159
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numerically superior opponent in difficult terrain. Mexican cowardice was
not only verified by these outcomes but, as Lieutenant General Franklin
Pierce insisted, critical to them.162
Racist sentiment was even more evident when American soldiers
discussed Mexicans as people rather than as fighters. Several openly
condemned Mexicans as "the laziest people in existence" or as "ignorant,
indolent, inefficient creatures."163

Others who were less hostile merely

lamented the miserable state of Mexicans, whose lot was worse than that
of slaves.164 Some soldiers thought that this degraded existence indicated
that Mexicans were subhuman, and portrayed them as primitive and
even animalistic.165
The Mexicans whom American soldiers depicted were not the sort
to stand up to an American occupation. Even if the Mexican race was
not inherently dull and apathetic, centuries under the foot of the Catholic
162

Musing over how his men had taken a defensible position with only light casualties,
Lieutenant General Franklin Pierce wrote, "Had they [the Mexican force] possessed
courage and skill in these of arms, our loss must have been very great." Letter from
Franklin Pierce, n.d.. General Scott and His Staff 141.
!<3 McClellan 11-12, Donnavan 24.
164
Preston graphically portrayed Mexicans as utterly wretched a n d pathetic "inmates" of
hell. Preston 37-8. "The c o m m o n laborers of the Country are slaves more lost in every
point of view than our negroes." Anderson 270. A Tennessee man meticulously outlined
seven reasons why a peon was worse off than a slave. Furber 606. Both were clearly
commenting on the issue of slavery as much as the plight of Mexicans, but their
comments remain valuable descriptions of the perceived Mexican standard of living.
165
This soldier suggested that Mexicans could not comprehend the idea of foreigners,
thinking Americans were "strange, wild-looking, hairy f a c e d savages of the half horse
a n d half alligator breed." Autobiography of an English Soldier 138. Primitive Mexicans
were portrayed as awestruck at the steamer Ontario, fearing it was alive a n d might
annihilate them. Donnavan 16. "The inhabitants [were] little a b o v e savages." Tennery
37. "Five, out of its seven millions of inhabitants, are beasts of burden, with as little of
intellect as the asses whose burdens they share." Letter from Major General Quitman, 15
October 1847, Genera/ Scott and His Staff (102-5).
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Church and Spanish dons meant to Americans that society
acclimated to despotic conditions. 166
matter.

had

Who held the authority did not

A volunteer frankly asserted, "I believe the majority are alike

indifferent whether the Great Mogul or James K. Polk rules over them,
provided they can sell their grapes, peaches, corn and red peppers, a n d
smoke their segars [sic] in peace." 1 6 7
It is an unsurprising coincidence, then, that American soldiers'
accounts did not depict an aggressive or lasting negative local reaction
when they first entered Mexican cities. Some described the population as
outright welcoming.

The Mexicans that Americans encountered were

"exceedingly polite and accommodating," and "fraternized with the
'Yankees' in the pleasantest manner." 168

On the road to Mexico City,

Jalapans were "hospitable" and "friendly to the Americans." 169 Pueblans
turned out on the streets and in a n d upon the houses like a "New York
crowd on some celebration day - turning the New Yorkers into some
resemblance to Florida Indians." 170 Americans were received into Mexico
City so joyously, wrote one soldier, that he felt like they were being

166

Mexicans "have for three hundred years d e p e n d e d on a monarchical a n d despotic
government." Donnavan 62. "They bend their necks to the yoke of the Spanish dons,
without thinking of their miserably degraded state. It will take a century to rouse them
from their torpor and to make them feel that they are free." Anderson 270. Mexicans still
worshiped even though "charity is reserved for the priest and is not to be bestowed on
suffering humanity." Preston 37. "The millions are steeped in ignorance, vice, a n d
poverty, abject to the priests and trampled to the dust by the wealthy." Smith 154.
167
Account of an unnamed volunteer, General Scott and His Staff 176.
168
Furber 404, Grant 118.
169
Donnavan 101, Autobiography of an English Soldier 205.
170
Anderson 174.
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welcomed home; an odd welcome considering that a day-long shootout
with snipers began shortly thereafter.171 Zacatecas, a city that remained
in Mexican control throughout the war, even had a sizeable group who
eagerly anticipated the arrival of American forces, according to a
prisoner of war held there.172
Some descriptions in other accounts or of different cities portrayed
a simply passive Mexican population. Several soldiers were struck by how
apathetic civilians were about the war, offering no resistance to the
American invasion.173

When the soldiers came, citizens in Tampico,

Jalapa, Camargo, and Amazoque seemed to carry on with their lives as
usual, not welcoming nor reviling the Americans.174 If anyone had cause
for anger at the United States military, it was the citizens of Vera Cruz, who
endured a long bombardment and were refused by General Scott an

171

"As the Mexicans marched out on one side ot the city, w e marched in from the other,
and from the evidence of joy at meeting us, I could not help thinking that they thought
w e must have been there before. White flags were waving from every window, a n d
every balcony was c r o w d e d with ladies, all welcoming us and waving their white
handkerchiefs at us." Norton 173-4.
172
"A p e a c e party, numbering among its members many native citizens of influence a n d
wealth... was awaiting with much anxiety the a p p e a r a n c e of Gen. Taylor a n d his army,
whose a d v a n c e upon the place was then daily anticipated." Donnavan 50.
173 " w h e n w e reached sight of the city [Tampico] there were Mexicans enough gathered
on the landing to have driven us back with clubs and stones, if they had had the spirit to
have done so, but they offered no resistance and w e boldly disembarked a n d took the
town." Collins 42. Another town was taken very easily, without resistance or disturbance.
Norton 152. "The apathy in relation to the war, however, in the whole Mexican
territory..." Samuel Francis Du Pont, Official Dispafches and Leffers of Rear Admiral Du
Ponf (Wilmington, DE: Press of Ferris Brothers, 1883), 12.
174
At Tampico, "They seem to evince no dissatisfaction at our presence." Anderson 21.
Locals in Jalapa " a p p e a r e d perfectly indifferent to us, manifesting neither pleasure nor
sorrow at our approach." McClellan 91. "The people [of Camargo] appear quiet a n d
inoffensive..." Curtis 126. "The inhabitants [of Amazoque] were not at all alarmed by our
approach." The streets remained crowded and trade stayed in full swing. Smith 162.
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opportunity to evacuate the women and children. But on survivors' taces,
wrote Captain Anderson, "the countenance bore more of sadness and
sorrow than of anger."175
Those who did not initially welcome or tolerate the Americans were
characterized as being understandably fearful of the invading army.
Some citizens in Tampico, Marin, Cerralvo, Puebla, and Mexico City shut
themselves up in their homes or fled to the countryside, but once these
people discovered that they had nothing to fear from American soldiers,
they too seemed to come around and accept the army's presence.'76
Just days after the chaotic combat in Mexico City, General Scott
optimistically reported that, "families are now generally returning; business
of every kind has been resumed, and the city is already tranquil and
cheerful, under the admirable conduct (with exceptions very few and
trifling) of our gallant troops."177 No matter which way the soldiers wrote
that they were received, Mexican civilians seemed to cause little trouble
for the occupying forces.

' " A n d e r s o n 103.
Some in Tampico "shut themselves up in their houses as if in a state of siege," but not
long afterward the city b e c a m e "bustling a n d animated." Autobiography of an English
Soldier 138-9. "Both this place [Marin] a n d Cerralvo were nearly deserted, and men,
w o m e n and children were seen running a n d scattered over the hills as w e a p p r o a c h e d ;
but when the people returned they found all their a b a n d o n e d property safe, which must
have given them a favorable opinion of Los Grengos - 'the Yankees.'" Grant 107. "The
inhabitants [of Puebla] are fast losing their false impressions and becoming reconciled to
us." Smith 168. "The people [of Mexico City] began to make their appearance upon the
streets without fear of the invaders." Grant 164.
177
Winfield Scott, report on operations after the battle of Molina del Rey, General Scott
and His Staff 67.
176
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Ordinary Mexicans left behind too little evidence to gauge exactly
how accepting they were of the occupation, but American soldiers'
accounts of the population's response fitted too conveniently with their
racist views of Mexicans to be taken as gospel. It is difficult to believe that
some of the Mexican populace did not feel some sense of nationalism
and react angrily to their country's occupation by gr'mgos.u8 However,
soldiers were convinced that they had accurately appraised the
population's inherent racial and social traits. Although some tentatively
questioned portions of widely held stereotypes, none disagreed that they
held elements of truth and that Mexicans were, on the whole, a
submissive people.179 As a result, American soldiers were confident that
Mexicans would provide little resistance to the occupation.

American Conduct
General Scott's "very few and trifling" exceptions betrayed a flaw in
the otherwise sparkling American conduct in Mexico City: the behavior of
volunteers. Washington deemed the United States Army in 1846 to be
178

The snipers who targeted American troops parading through Mexico City seem like
glaring examples of this attitude, though Americans did not consider them representative
of the townspeople as a while. Grant described the shootings as "the hostile acts of
liberated convicts." Grant 163. Norton neglected to mention the firefight altogether in
his description of entering the city. Norton 174.
179
Furber qualified the stereotype that Mexicans were stupid by writing, "Mexican
children are always more precocious a n d brighter than those of our country at the same
age. One is astonished at the genius and talent exhibited by the boys at from eight to
fourteen years of a g e ; but at that a g e they b e c o m e dull a n d stupid, a n d so afterward
continue." Furber 609. The stereotype of Mexican idleness applied to men, but "any
person who thinks the Mexicans cannot be industrious should see these girls washing in
Jalapa." Autobiography of an English Soldier 208.
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unable to adequately prosecute the war alone, so President Polk
a p p e a l e d to the states to create volunteer regiments to fill the ranks.
General Taylor perceptively noted, "Volunteers were never intended to
invad [sic] or carry on war out of the limits of their own country, but should
be used, as the constitution intended they should be for enforcing the
execution of the laws; & repelling invasion, for which they are admirably
suited." 180 What these men had in patriotism and courage, professional
soldiers and volunteers alike knew they lacked in orderly conduct in a
foreign country.

Volunteers admitted their undisciplined behavior, but

rather than consider its implications on the occupation, they emphasized
its importance to being a g o o d American. Regulars, not to pass up an
opportunity to criticize their more publicized and popular comrades-inarms, freely condemned the volunteers for their gross misconduct. Yet the
professional soldiers also downplayed its harm to the occupation, by
putting the problem in the context of the Mexican experience a n d
portraying it as something that could be overcome.

On the whole,

regulars a n d volunteers agreed that the American occupation provided
a level of justice, stability, and protection that had been unknown under
the Mexican government.
According to the regulars, the "malditos volunteros" gained quite a
reputation in Mexico and were "objects of special detestation" a m o n g

!so Taylor 51.
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the people.' 81 The Mexicans knew their arrival meant trouble.182 While
occupying towns, volunteers behaved

"in a most shameful

and

disgraceful manner" by gambling, drinking, vandalizing, and being noisy
and rowdy.183 Guards had to be stationed with fixed bayonets at "places
of amusement" just to try to keep volunteers in line.184 Regular soldiers
reported that unruly behavior even resulted in murders. Lethal skirmishes
with locals and guerillas led volunteers to commit vengeance killings
among the local populace.185

Some Texan volunteers gained such a

reputation for brutality that one regular soldier wrote, "[the] fearful
atrocities committed by them now form part of the Nursery Legends of the
country."18*

181

Autobiography of an English Soldier 138.
"Until the Volunteers c a m e , the citizens a p p e a r e d inclined to be sociable. But now
many have left, a n d gone into the interior." Anderson 12. People from Jalapa were
"friendly to the Americans, yet dreaded the presence of a large body of volunteers in
the town..." Autobiography of an English Soldier 205. "The consequences of these things
[volunteer misconduct] is a great many families have left their homes and gone into the
interior a n d a great many more will leave. The c o m m o n people are also scared a n d
many of them have left." Dana 152.
183
"The volunteers carry on in a most shameful a n d disgraceful manner." McClellan 18.
Volunteers gambled, drank at bars, and arrested locals willy-nilly. Chamberlain 58, 75.
"The Theatre is filled with noisy Volunteers some of w h o m are taken away from their frolics
there every night and given a place on the floor of our filthy guardhouse." Anderson 46.
"The wild volunteers as soon as beyond the Rio Grande, committed, with impunity, all
sorts of atrocities on the persons and property of Mexicans." Scott 392.
184 "At all places of amusement are found sentinels with their fixed bayonets; they are
even on the ballroom floor. And this is necessary to keep our free a n d independent
citizens in order!" Anderson 47.
185
Chamberlain gave a fantastic a n d almost certainly exaggerated account of the
'Massacre at the Cave,' where Arkansas cavalry supposedly butchered a n d scalped
Mexicans in retribution for a guerilla killing. Chamberlain 88. Twenty-five Louisville Legion
volunteers "went out regularly to work to murder Mexicans because one of their men
had been killed in a drunken outrage among the Mexicans." Dana 152. "They think
nothing of robbing a n d killing the Mexicans." McClellan 18.
186
Chamberlain 177.
182
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Of course regulars, frustrated with the volunteer presence, had
reason to exaggerate some of this unruly behavior. An officer of the Ohio
Volunteers politely wrote of their prejudice that, "I have always been
proud of our regular army, but there are some small minds in all places
and even good men do not all seem to regard with generous equality
those who have volunteered to leave their homes and business to
cooperate with them."187

He believed that regulars had inflated the

actions of a few, because if volunteer misconduct was really so bad, most
Mexicans would have scattered and Americans would be up in arms.188
However these stories held some degree of truth because volunteers
confirmed their own undisciplined conduct in their accounts.189
This sort of behavior contradicted the army's occupation policy, but
volunteers justified their disobedience as a virtue. These citizen soldiers
were "fully equal" to the regulars, but "a volunteer here, in every little
matter of ceremony, will not be bound down, as a regular is obliged to
be."190 Not being forced to obey was essential to freedom, so choosing

187

Curtis 31-2
"The faults of the few will a t t a c h to the entire corps." If even just ten of his men m a d e
an effort to cause trouble, "this town would be in the greatest terror. The Mexicans
would scatter to the four winds, a n d all the Americans in town would cry out in horror,
'look at the d
d volunteers, they are unfit for service.'" Curtis 92.
189
Tennery confirmed volunteer rioting, drinking, revelry, and poor discipline. Tennery 18,
68, 78. A group of Arkansas volunteers proudly publicized the vengeance killings they
committed. Wynkoop 91. Colonel Norton went into explicit detail about how he a n d a
comrade enjoyed tantalizing Mexicans with coins that they had heated in a coal brazier.
After getting bored of that g a m e , they then d u m p e d water and flour from a balcony all
over the beggars that they had attracted. Norton 197-8. He also admitted that a "spirit
of vandalism pervaded the army" at Mexico City. Norton 179.
'9o Furber 433.
188
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whether or not to follow superior officers' orders was fundamentally
American.191
Professional soldiers criticized the lack of discipline that this mentality
on military obedience encouraged, but they were not worried that
volunteer misconduct would compromise the occupation. Some soldiers,
whose task was to fix the problem, praised the measures that the army
had taken to maintain order. Units were organized to police the streets
and reduce crime. On a judicial level, military tribunals were created to
try and punish the soldiers who had committed transgressions. According
to their accounts, both were successful in repairing the damage done to
Mexicans' confidence.192
Despite the issue of discipline in the ranks, both regulars and
volunteers who were inclined to write about the achievements of the
occupation were convinced that the army had established excellent
stability. Numerous officers reported that the Mexican people were better

191

An a n e c d o t e emerged from the war that demonstrated well how not being bound by
convention had b e c o m e fused with patriotism. At a show at the National Theater in
Mexico City, volunteers raucously harassed the bewildered Mexican performers. When
the b a n d eventually played the United States national anthem to calm their audience
down, the rowdy bunch was portrayed as American heroes. Wynkoop 19. For more
discussion of how not being bound by convention a n d military discipline had b e c o m e
fused with patriotism, see Ricardo Herrera, "Self Governance a n d the American Citizen
Soldier," The Journal of Military History vol. 65, no. 1 (2001), 32-33.
192
"These measures [patrols] tended to assure the inhabitants of General Scott's g o o d
intentions; a n d in a very short time the most complete confidence was restored."
Autobiography of an English Soldier 268. "It [the tribunal system] has been admitted by
all that the order worked like a charm; that it conciliated Mexicans; intimidated the
vicious of the several races, and being executed with impartial rigor, gave the highest
moral deportment and discipline ever known in an invading army." Scott 396. Captain
Anderson portrayed his work in tribunals as helpful in resolving the issue. Anderson 300.
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off under American administration than they had been under their own
government, and that most of the populace appreciated the change.193
Several mentioned that local Mexican leaders formally thanked American
occupation officials for their efforts to establish peace and justice.194 Two
even suggested that Mexicans under the occupation were in some ways
better off than American civilians back home!195

Captain Anderson

provided perspective to the issue of misconduct, writing, "I fear that there
are occasional violations of Genl. Scott's orders, on the part of the
Volunteers, and in a small way, on the part of the Regulars, but all these

193

"The city was well governed and the natives themselves admitted that they felt more
secure in their persons a n d property than they did when they had the government in
their own hands." Collins 43. "I think that as tar as I c a n see the laboring Mexicans care
very little about the War, and that, by a continuance of this course, after a few months
they will feel more secure in their persons and property than they have ever been under
their own authorities." Anderson 147-8.
" G o o d order, or the protection of religion,
persons, property, a n d industry were coextensive with the American rule... Mexicans
had never before known equal prosperity... Intelligent Mexicans, a n d , indeed, the great
body of the people, felt a n d acknowledged the happy change." Scott 580-1. "I believe
a majority of the better citizens were looking forward to the occupation of the city by the
American forces, as their only hope of security against the thieving propensities of the
Mexican soldiery, who infested it." Donnavan 97. "In fact, under the humane policy of
our commander, I question whether the great majority of the Mexican people did not
regret our departure as much as they had regretted our coming. Property and person
were thoroughly protected, and a market was afforded for all the products of the
country such as the people had never enjoyed before." Grant 118. Honorable conduct
had a noticeable effect on the Mexican public. Autobiography of an English Soldier 211.
194
In a letter, a Mexican Prefect thanked an American Captain and praised the conduct
of his men for mounting a raid on a nearby tribe of "savages" to recover animals a n d
property plundered from local Mexicans. Jose Ignacio Arrabe to Captain Reid, 18 May
1847, General Scott and His Staff 185. A pair of Alcaldas "called on me a n d spoke of
giving some kind acknowledgement of my services a n d kindness to the inhabitants."
Curtis 206.
,95
"I will venture the assertion, without fear of contradiction, that, in no City of the same
size, either in our own blessed Country or in any other, is private property, or are private
rights, more secure and better guarded than here." Anderson 272. "It seems the rights of
these Mexicans are better guaranteed than the rights of our citizens in the states would
be." Curtis 32.
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combined amount to much less than they have been compelled to bear
from their own soldiery."196
Soldiers ignored the hypocrisy of claiming that Americans had
established peace, justice and stability, while admitting that volunteers
had committed actions that seriously violated each.

They also

downplayed the damage volunteer misconduct did to MexicanAmerican relations in occupied territories, evidenced by Mexican leeriness
of these citizen soldiers. Instead, Americans maintained their confident
assessment of the occupation by neglecting volunteer misbehavior when
it was convenient to, making it seem surmountable or justifiable, and
qualifying their misdeeds as somehow less egregious than those
committed by the former Mexican authorities. Volunteer rowdiness was
apparently just a minor blemish on a campaign that had, overall, 'won
the hearts and minds' of the people.

Resistance
Given the professed success of the occupation in conciliating the
Mexican people, it might have seemed hard to explain the sizable guerilla
movement in the countryside.

American soldiers were aware of the

scope of guerilla activity and of the trouble an active resistance could
cause, but they were also convinced that these men were not resisters.

196

Anderson 147-8.
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Instead, guerillas were roving groups of bandits with no support a m o n g
upstanding Mexican citizens.

The bandits were no threat to

the

occupation; they merely amounted to a nuisance that could

be

overcome.
When it b e c a m e apparent that the Mexican Army could not repel
the invaders, American troops heard news that Mexican authorities had
taken major steps to encourage resistance.' 97 Captain Anderson thought
it unlikely that the populace would enthusiastically c o m m e n c e full scale
guerilla warfare, but already many guerillas roamed the countryside. 198
Many soldiers emphasized the raiders' numbers or their threat to American
communication lines.199

If this constituted the core of a

m

Mexican

Captain Anderson copied a printed and circulated declaration of resistance from the
Mexican Congress that emphasized the people's resolve. Anderson 269. "The best
informed Mexicans in this section of the country, with whom I have conversed, say there
will be no p e a c e ; that eleven of the states of Mexico had united to carry on the war in
the best w a y they could." Taylor 148-9. "Since the battle of Cerro Gordo, the Mexican
Congress have passed a law making it treason for any one to propose p e a c e , in fact,
declaring perpetual war." Smith 144. "My impression is that a general order has been
issued by the rebel authorities to carry on a guerilla warfare in all directions." Du Pont
223.
198
"I do not believe that the Mexicans will attempt a g a m e in which they are so certain
of being the heaviest losers." Anderson 161.
199
"Guerrilla bands... infest every part of the road to Vera Cruz." Anderson 314. "Small
bands of robbers... infest the greater portion of the inhabited parts of this unfortunate
country." "The robbers are still infesting the road between this [Monterrey] a n d Rio
Grande." Taylor 94, 149. Along the Camino Real, "the whole country thereabouts was
swarming with guerrillas." Norton 186. "The roads are filled with bands of robbers under
the name of guerillas." Smith 153. In the countryside outside Camargo, many "straggling
parties of armed Mexicans were frequently seen prowling about in that vicinity."
Donnavan 25. "The highways used, or about to be used, by the
American troops, being still infested in many parts by those atrocious bands called
guerillas or rancheros..." Scott 574. "Frequent depredations of numerous guerilla parties
upon the w a g o n trains of the American army, passing between Cerralvo a n d
Monterey..." Guerrilla chief Father Jarauta's "frequent depredations upon American
trains passing between Vera Cruz and the capital, has raised him to an unenviable
notoriety."
Wynkoop 51, 100. The Mexican leader Canales threatened lines of
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resistance, one soldier worried that it "may prolong it [the war] to an
almost indefinite period, unless a new degree of energy shall be infused
into American forces."200
Yet the guerillas were not part of an organized opposition to the
American occupation.

The same soldier wrote that the Mexican

government's endorsement of guerilla warfare merely gave "authority to
every score of ruffians" in the country to go about "robbing and
murdering indiscriminately."201 Other soldiers shared this sentiment. The
term guerilla was frequently used interchangeably with the words robbers,
rabble, and rancheros.202
Fitting with this role as ruthless bandits, guerillas apparently had few
scruples about targeting their own countrymen. Soldiers often portrayed
Mexican civilians as fearful of guerilla raids.203 Aside from "robbing and

communications through guerrilla warfare. Chamberlain 218. "A train is very difficult to
protect at all points from the attacks of guerillas." Collins 68.
200
Donnavan 116.
201
Donnavan 116,25.
202
Outlaws certainly remained active in Mexico during the occupation, but soldiers
unreasonably labeled all Mexicans who participated in irregular warfare as bandits. "It
was robbed by some of the rancheros, or in other words, by some of the old established
robbers, who now design legalizing their rascality by claiming to belong to the Mexican
Guerrillas." Artillery 183. "Guerillars [sic] at last!" After a skirmish, Chamberlain listed the
number of casualties "of the robbers." Chamberlain 220, 222. Zachary Taylor never used
the word guerilla in his unofficial correspondence, instead calling those who e n g a g e d in
that "description of warfare" "robbers." Taylor 94, 149. "The roads are filled with bands
of robbers under the name of guerillas." Smith 153. "It is thought that the guerillas a n d
rabble are in league together..." Smith 166. "They say the surrounding country is infested
with robbers and guerilla bands..." Collins 67. "Those atrocious bands called guerillas or
rancheros... No quarter will be given to known murderers or robbers, whether guerillas or
rancheros" Scott 574-5.
203
"...roaming bands of robbers, as much to be dreaded by the Mexicans as by the
Americans." Norton 126. "The guerilla priest, Jarauta, ...has long been the terror of all
p e a c e a b l e Mexicans within his reach." Scott 567. Friendly people in Baja California
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murdering their own inhabitants," guerillas were rumored to commit
horrific deeds with their Mexican victims.204

Private Chamberlain, who

had accused Texas Rangers of major atrocities, wrote, "The guerillars [sic],
if possible, were guilty of worse acts than the Rangers, and the conflict
was no longer war but murder, and a disgrace to any nation calling itself
Christian."205
Had the Mexican government intended the guerilla movement to
form the base of a resistance, their plan apparently backfired. In the way
that soldiers depicted them, guerillas could find no support among the
population, and their actions sometimes even pushed Mexicans into the
arms of the invaders.

Continuing the theme of Mexican-American

conciliation, several officers pointed out how some guerilla parties unified
Americans and local Mexicans against a common enemy.

Mexican

authorities assisted American troops in stamping out these threats to
peace and stability, and better appreciated the protection that the
American occupation provided.206

were victims of guerillas. Du Pont 36. "The roads are filled with bands of robbers under
the name of guerillas, who are as ready to plunder a n d murder the Mexicans as they are
to attack us." Smith 154. "The inhabitants of Jalapa are in a state of uneasiness a n d
alarm. They say the surrounding country is infested with robbers and guerilla bands, a n d
that as soon as w e remove our protection from the town they will rush in and rob, pillage,
a n d murder the inhabitants." Collins 67.
204
Norton 111. Chamberlain, who could be counted on to give the most sensational
account, gave graphic descriptions of guerillas blowing up victims and forcing girls to d o
their bidding. Chamberlain 176.
205 Chamberlain 177.
206 -r w o thousand convicts a n d as many guerillas (soldiers "who had disbanded
themselves and thrown off their uniforms") in Mexico City were put d o w n thanks to
American troops a n d "the exertions of municipal authorities." At Atlixco, a city that
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Guerilla activity may have been widespread, but so long as it did
not indicate a potentially dangerous resistance movement, the American
forces were confident that the occupation could go on unimpeded. One
officer styled guerilla warfare, "a matter not likely to produce important
results, except the loss here and there of valuable lives."207

Army

detachments guarded towns and participated in "Guerillar [sic] hunting"
to limit the damage that could be done.208 The conventional forces of
the Mexican army were seen as the major obstacle to the American
occupation, and once they had disbanded, some accounts suggested,
the careful soldier had nothing to fear from unorthodox fighters like
guerillas.209
Again, soldiers portrayed an aspect of the occupation in a
suspiciously convenient manner. Although Mexico was well known for its
banditry, it is difficult to believe that, given the broad scope of the guerilla
movement, all guerillas were petty robbers. Sources from the guerillas'
perspective are lacking, but the Mexican government's call to resist must

formerly supported guerilla activity, "so much terror has been impressed upon them [the
citizens]... that I a m inclined to believe they will give us no more trouble." General Scott
and His Staff 67, 135. "This is a fine state of things truly, when these people must call on a
foreign invading army to protect them against their own country-men." Collins 67.
207
Du Pont 223.
208 Guerillas visited Puebla daily incognito, but because "our guards are so strong a n d our
troops so well posted that they will not attempt to commit any depredations on our
property or persons." Anderson 224. "Guerillar [sic] hunting" had b e c o m e a phrase for
finding a n d routing guerilla parties. Chamberlain 221.
209
Captain Anderson was not afraid of the march because "I have not the least idea of
seeing a soldier enemy between this and Puebla." Anderson 160. "There is no danger...
I d o not believe there will be any more fighting except with small parties; from what I c a n
learn from well informed Mexicans, their army has pretty much disbanded" Taylor 146.
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have been compelling motivation for the patriotic and the faithful.
Americans, however, found that the stereotype of Mexican lawlessness
rang true to their understanding of the country, and were quick to point to
guerillas' offenses against fellow countrymen as proof that these were
bands of criminals, not freedom fighters. Rabble, in turn, was something
that could be dealt with, reinforcing the confident depiction of the
occupation.

American Superiority
The potential obstacles to occupying Mexico outlined above were
portrayed by soldiers as nonexistent, unimportant, or surmountable. But if
unforeseeable problems should present themselves, a sense of general
American superiority encouraged faith in the United States' ability to
overcome.

Some conveyed their confidence through expressions of

racial and cultural superiority over the Mexicans, while others highlighted
American gallantry and ingenuity. These convictions combined to leave
the reader feeling optimistic about the success of any American venture
in Mexico.
During the war, Mexico played the role of a foil to the United States
in Americans' soldiers accounts.210 Thus when these authors constructed
their depictions of the Mexican people, they shed light on what they
2,0

"The people of the two nations differ as widely as the poles, in their habits, pursuits,
and conceptions of what constitutes refinement." Donnavan 53.
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thought Americans were by showing what Mexicans were not. Specific
language was used to highlight what traits were absent: Mexicans were
"not patriotic... nor generous and manly." 211

Neither were they "an

industrious and enterprising population, such as is generally found in the
towns of the United States."212

What positive and productive qualities

Mexicans lacked, Americans had.

Some went so far as to d e e m it

unnatural that the unworthy Mexicans inhabited the land as a race, a n d
American

superiority was

most

vigorously

recommended Mexico's domination. 213

asserted

by

those

who

What obstacles could possibly

hinder the American occupation when annexation was as unavoidable
as "destiny?" 21 *
Expressing cultural superiority was less sensational than declaring
racial superiority, but it subtly achieved the same goal.

The scenes of

"utter Mexican wretchedness" that soldiers depicted would never be
found in the civilized world of the United States.215

But rather than

2" Collins 67.
2'2Donnavan 15.
213
For a stable government to b e c o m e established in Mexico, "the country must be
inhabited by a different race of people." Tennery 37. "At some future day, when a
civilized and enlightened people shall succeed the present
Population..." When implies inevitability. D o n n a v a n 3 1 . "What a wrong a n d unnatural
thing it is that this beautiful country should be possessed by such a worthless, idle, vicious,
mongrel race." Collins 68. "If she makes the g a m e last much longer, w e will not have
the Rio Grande for a boundary but the chain of mountains called Sierra del Madre." VV/7/
is a very strong word, emphasizing American capability. Dana 85.
214
"I say, hold on to this country. It is its destiny. It is ours. We are compelled to this policy
w e cannot avoid it." Major General Quitman, 15 October 1847, General Scott and His
Staff 103.
215
At the town of Perote, "The men haunted the silent and ruinous streets with their
melancholy visages, and w r a p p e d in their dingy blankets, looking like spectres of famine;
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portraying Mexican indolence, ignorance, and misery as something
racially inherent, these soldiers attributed them to the oppressive Mexican
government and the Catholic Church.216 The American occupation was
construed by some as a philanthropic opportunity for a civilized people to
establish a responsible government in the backward nation.2'7 Although
they used less belligerent rhetoric, their message of American superiority
over the Mexicans was the same.
The term superiority implies something relative, but discussions of
American greatness on the battlefield needed no comparison.

The

successful campaign against the large, proud Mexican army was no small
feat of American arms, noted several soldiers.218

Components of

no employment, or any appearance of it, nothing but dirt, indolence, hunger, and utter
Mexican wretchedness, in the midst of scenes of smiling plenty." Autobiography of an
English Soldier 224. At a scene of worship, "crowds of lepers in gaudy a n d ragged scraps
with matted hair and naked limbs; wretches in the foulest rags; mendicants a n d humble,
half naked Indians kneel and creep on the floor." Preston 37.
216
"Under the present system of religious intolerance which prevails in Mexico, it cannot
be expected that the country will b e c o m e progressive or prosperous." Autobiography of
an English Soldier 233. "Education would make them g o o d citizens. Ignorance keeps
them serfs." Anderson 181. "Her people [Baja Californians] have struggled against this
neglect and misrule, and are very poor." Du Pont 12. "The millions are... abject to the
priests and trampled to the dust by the wealthy." Smith 154.
2,7
"The home question then bears upon the soul - are w e to be kept here as guardians of
a people who acknowledge themselves incompetent of self-government?" Anderson
331-2. "If anything c a n reconcile one to the injustice of carrying the war into the interior
of Mexico, it would be the benefit that might possibly result, by showing the Mexicans the
grievous inferiority of vigorous action which the deadening influence of this system has
produced." Autobiography of an English Soldier 233.
218
"They [Mexicans] c a n scarcely realize their misfortune and cannot account for the
best army which ever left Mexico being thus cut up by a handful of men..." Dana 69.
"Here was a spectacle heretofore unheard of: A mere handful of men, entering with
hostile intentions a nation of the magnitude of the Mexican Republic; they, a nation
trained to arms from their infancy, boasting of their military prowess and achievements in
bygone days; w e , leaving a Congress behind us debating whether they would furnish us
the means of subsistence or whether w e should be left to our fate, a n d some of that
Congress wishing that w e might be ' welcomed by bloody hands to inhospitable graves;'
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American gallantry were scattered through many soldiers' battlefield
accounts, but they could all be found in Private Chamberlain's classic
story of the battle of Buena Vista. Outnumbered by uncharacteristically
capable Mexican foes, American forces initially endured an enormous
onslaught.

The tension was palpable as the Americans

almost

succumbed, but at the last moment they heroically rallied and carried the
day. 2 ' 9 Chamberlain's story characteristically read as if it were made for
the silver screen, but even battlefield reports contained the rhetoric of
heroism.220 Every clash generated more stories of American gallantry of
which people became "surfeited in these days of heroics."221 Indeed,
not-so-friendly rivalries began between regiments who fought over which
had been the most gallant, according to one officer; "Such is glory!"222
Such faith in American battlefield proficiency inspired great
confidence despite the odds. Independent of their criticisms of Mexican
army, some American troops displayed absolute conviction in their ability

yet w e pushed on, with a force never exceeding eleven or twelve thousand men, first
capturing their metropolis, then penetrating to the heart of their country." Norton 165.
219 Chamberlain 119-128.
220
Reports e n g a g e d in the rhetoric of heroics ranging from briefly to elaborately.
According to one concise report, orders were "finely executed by this gallant army"
Scott 436. General Quitman reported much more floridly, "How this gallant army of nine
thousand men descended into this valley, broke through a line of almost impregnable
batteries in four battles d e f e a t e d an enemy of thirty-five thousand, took more than one
hundred guns, a n d four thousand prisoners, and erected the glorious stars and stripes' on
this palace, where, since the conquest of Cortez, no stranger banner had ever w a v e d . "
General Scott and His Staff 103.
221
General Scott and His Staff 103.
222
Smith 213.
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to overcome this most conventional threat to the occupation. 2 2 3 Guerilla
parties and volunteer misconduct were also being dealt with, and twice,
soldiers specifically mentioned that "Yankee ingenuity" helped surmount
other major obstacles. 224 General Scott praised the merits of "this glorious
army, which has now overcome all difficulties - distance, climate, ground,
fortifications, numbers." 225 So successful were the Americans than some
soldiers even suspected divine intervention. 226

The American

army

seemed virtually impervious to all obstacles, including those presented by
the occupation. An officer summed up the situation in that context, "It
appears that old Polk is really determined on swallowing Mexico without
any grease [diplomacy]. If he gives us the means, w e are just the boys to
d o it." 227

Disease
Any illusion of American invincibility was betrayed by the disease
that ravaged troops in Mexico. Sickness was the one exception to what
was commonly portrayed otherwise as a totally practicable occupation.

223 "We... feel confident of beating any Army Mexico c a n bring against us." Anderson
185. "No firing, men! If twenty dragoons c a n ' t whip a hundred greasers with the saber, I'll
join the Doughboys, and carry a fence rail all my life." Chamberlain 63.
2
24 Collins 79, Norton 167.
225
Scott 496.
226
"So constantly has victory perched on our banners under every disadvantage a n d
with every odds against us, that w e may well hope a n d believe that G o d is fighting our
battles with us, or rather for us." Anderson 310. At Fort Brown, "a kind Providence
protected us." Dana 67.
227
Dana 102.
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A number of soldiers simply could not ignore its devastating effects,
leaving in their accounts sobering descriptions of scope of illness. Yet
some nevertheless tried to convey a positive spin by showing scattered
skepticism of disease's ubiquity and insuperability.
Soldiers proudly reported that American forces had overcome the
enemy army, occupied large tracts of Mexico, and won the respect of
the populace, but many also grudgingly accepted that Americans had
not triumphed over illness.

The heavy toll disease had exacted was

apparent in the dwindling number of men fit for duty.228 Hospitals were
grimly depicted as filled beyond capacity with the sick.229 In the face of
such a powerful menace, soldiers' confidence faltered; one enlisted man
suspected that the rampant illness was the work of the devil himself.230

228

"A great deal of sickness prevailing among the troops." Autobiography of an English
Soldier 167. "The dress parade was a mere skeleton. Not more than 1/3 of the Regiment
was out. - C a m p looks like a hospital so many pale and sickly faces." Curtis 34. "As an
evidence of its unhealthiness, he stated that his battalion had been mustered into service
on the 28th of October, 1847, four hundred nineteen strong; that in six months he had lost
about two hundred men by death; that at that time he had but forty-two men for duty,
the rest being in the hospital, or languishing from disease; a n d that from a single
company, which at the time he had left the United States was ninety-seven strong, he
had lost by death one captain, two lieutenants, four sergeants, four corporals and fiftythree men." Preston 22. "The numbers, among the volunteers, afflicted with the measles
a n d mumps, in this vicinity, continue to be very great, and the erysipelas is c o m m o n
a m o n g all the corps." Scott 571.
229
"The sick list a n d the hospitals were full to overcrowding." Autobiography of an English
Soldier 233. Even when forces were stationed in town, "large a n d spacious" hospitals
were "crowded with sick." There were not enough beds or mattresses, so many had to
lay on the brick floor. Tennery 28. Volunteers c r o w d e d hospitals and "die like sheep."
McClellan 20. General Taylor wrote to a doctor, "While this war lasts you may always
calculate on having an overflowing hospital, m a d e up from the sick going & returning to
& from Mexico." Taylor 117.
230
"The king of terrors still reigns without a rival." Tennery 33.
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When illness so "severely shook the hardiest" soldiers, what could "those
whose constitutions were of merely human organization" possibly do?231
There was no concerted effort to portray disease as anything less
than devastating, but occasionally soldiers downplayed its severity. One
way to do so was to treat illness as matter-of-fact wastage. In the brutally
statistical field of logistics, death by disease became just one more factor
in military strategists' calculations. One soldier was horrified by how one
detached official could calmly accept an estimated ten percent
casualties when, in human terms, it meant "decimating twenty-five
thousand (25,000) brave fellows."232 Others insisted that disease was not
ubiquitous.

Some regulars, quick to criticize their

unprofessional

comrades, suggested that volunteers were particularly susceptible or apt
to claim sickness to avoid their duties.233 Others suggested that certain
maladies were linked to particular times, regions and environments.234 It

231

Autobiography of an English Soldier 205.
Preston 40.
233
Volunteers did not know proper hygiene, and almost every volunteer regiment
reported one third to one half their number sick. McClellan 19. A great deal of sickness
a n d mortality immediately ensued among the volunteers. Autobiography of an English
Soldier 205. Numerous new recruits, "after an arduous tour of duty, will be found on the
sick report for some days." Anderson 122.
234
"The yellow fever commences in Vera Cruz about the 15th of April, so w e have five
weeks for operations before a necessity will exist for our moving into the interior."
Anderson 71. Countryside water was the culprit. Anderson 154. "This [the state of
Tamaulipas] has the reputation of being the most sickly place in the world. Yellow fever
and black vomito sweep off its hundreds yearly. The place is almost surrounded by
stagnant pools and lagunas." Norton 81. Sickness could be justified because, "Probably
the change of air, experienced in our coming d o w n from the mountains so elevated, to
the lower coast, has a deleterious effect upon their constituitions (sic)." Furber 425.
232
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followed that avoiding or removing these could prevent outbreaks. 235
Soldiers who wrote about sickness as a story of burden and sacrifice
a d d e d a positive spin to a dark situation by applying the rhetoric of
American gallantry. 236

Captain Anderson's exercises in rationalization,

perhaps to reassure his wife that he was in no danger, bordered on
absurdity. He was so intent on downplaying the ravages of illness that his
letters ranged from claiming reports were exaggerated to claiming
Americans were acclimating. 237 These responses were not c o m m o n , nor
necessarily convincing given the confirmed dreadfulness and scope of
illness in the ranks.

Still, each effort helped to preserve the sense of

optimism and confidence that otherwise pervaded soldiers' accounts.

Conclusion
American soldiers shared a particular view of Mexico a n d the
United States that, overall, produced a unified, confident assessment of
the occupation. Strategically, the cities and mountain passes that they
235

Yankee ingenuity was also applied to the disease issue: "A rigid police has been
organized, which will, if efficiently carried out, remove the exciting causes to disease
before the most unhealthy part of the season begins, and it is to be sincerely h o p e d will
tend to a b a t e the violence of the Black Death vomite which rages here so fearfully."
Collins 59.
236
"That which has no remedy, however, must be borne." Collins 90. An account of a
youth dying of illness in a hospital had all of the elements of courageous sacrifice a n d
patriotic martyrdom. Furber 414.
237
"I must put you on your guard about listening to or rather believing the ten thousand
reports you will hear a n d see about the health of our troops. I find that letter writers who
are with us write lies, either through ignorance, inattention, or design. I will inform you if
there be any unusual degree of sickness in our Army." Anderson 113. "The whole Army
seems to be acclimating, as the sick lists of all our commands are large-that of ' G ' Co. is
slowly, I hope permanently, decreasing." Anderson 218-9.
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often encountered in their marches m a d e the entire country seem like it
could be held by such natural control points.

Once at those points,

impressive markets a n d sufficient trade indicated that supply was not an
issue, a n d ample amenities meant occupation did not have to feel
entirely like a tedious duty. These assessments were probably valid, but
only partially explained the logistical situation in such a way as to make
the occupation seem practicable.
The abject poverty many locals lived in affirmed for many soldiers
the stereotype of the miserable, cowardly, lazy, and
Mexican.

uneducated

Others saw it as a result of centuries of oppression, or some

combination of the two. Both interpretations meant Mexican resistance
was far-fetched, and their accounts of entering towns reflect that. The
guerillas who did fight back were not resisters but pesky robbers, w h o m
c o m m o n Mexicans seemed to detest as much as Americans did.
American soldiers were confident that they accurately

understood

Mexican people and society, causing them to reject interpretations of the
situation that might make the occupation seem less feasible.
Soldiers' notions of American virtue also meant that Mexicans had
no reason to resist. They were better off under the justice a n d stability that
the United States provided, despite volunteers' transgressions. American
gallantry went hand in hand with American virtue, and soldiers b e c a m e
convinced they could accomplish almost anything, no matter the odds.
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This confidence helped erase any further doubt that the United States
could successfully occupy Mexico.
The biggest perceived threat to the occupation was ironically the
smallest: the microbe.

On this issue, some soldiers deviated from the

prevailing theme of optimism.

Attempts to downplay the d a m a g e

wrought by illness were less persuasive, weaker points in otherwise strong
accounts.

And so disease takes its place as the one exception to an

otherwise universally positive appraisal of the occupation.
Soldiers' optimism in the face of such a large undertaking reflected
the confidence shared by many Americans.

While policies of Manifest

Destiny remained open to debate, this confident ideology affected the
dialogue by downplaying doubts that America could expand. Although
evidence

of stereotypes

inferiority

are

abundant

about
and

American

superiority

well-documented,

and

Mexican

identifying

them

specifically in soldiers' accounts is useful to demonstrate how Americans
arrived at their optimistic conclusions.
tasks

of

occupation,

soldiers

application of their beliefs.

wrote

Being confronted daily with the
quite

elaborately

about

the

In their stories, more clearly than in

contemporary media evidence or politicians' papers, one can see the
mechanics that led Americans from their understanding of Mexico a n d
the United States in 1848 to the conclusion that the annexation of Mexico
was readily possible.
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FIGURE 4:
This diagram depicts the major American operations during the MexicanAmerican War.
"1846-1847 - The Mexican War 1846-1847," American Military History,
United States Army Center of Military History, 1989. Courtesy of the
University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin.
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FIGURE 5:
This m a p traces the route taken by General Scott during his a d v a n c e on
Mexico City. The "Camino Real," or Royal Road, was the only major
access route through the mountainous terrain between Vera Cruz a n d
Mexico City. It cut through the rugged Sierra Madre Oriental range,
connecting the cities of Jalapa a n d Puebla along the way.
William R. Shepherd, "Campaigns of the Mexican War Inset, Route from
Vera Cruz to Mexico," Historical Atlas (New York: Henry Holt a n d
Company, 1923). Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The
University of Texas at Austin.
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CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

The value of annexing Mexico was a subject of intense debate in
the winter of 1847-8, but America's ability to accomplish such a task was
not. Americans commonly understood the United States to be superior to
Mexico on multiple levels, and quite c a p a b l e of projecting its power.
Consequently, there was little basis on which to dispute the feasibility of
annexation.
Despite disagreeing on the practicality a n d morality of absorbing all
of Mexico, American politicians on both sides of the argument felt that if
the United States committed itself to annexation, it could be done. Their
debates not only failed to challenge the feasibility of all Mexico, but also
exposed particular beliefs that justified American confidence.
These

perceptions

were

displayed

and

elaborated

on

in

contemporary periodicals, sources that both reflected a n d influenced
society.

Mexican society was depicted as corrupt, abject, a n d easily

dominated, while America c a m e across as spirited, powerful, a n d
pointedly superior. Together, these c o m m o n beliefs left no doubt that the
United States could annex its southern neighbor.
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Demonstrating how firmly set these general perceptions were in
American society, even American soldiers who participated in the
occupation held them.

Themes of Mexican weakness a n d American

strength readily appeared in their writings, even though they f a c e d
evidence to the contrary.

Through this lens there was little doubt that

Mexico could be dominated for the long term.
Had Nicholas Trist followed President Polk's orders and returned to
his country without a p e a c e treaty, the boundaries of the United States
may well have extended much further south than the Rio Grande.

By

every indication, the all Mexico movement would continue to gather
momentum as long as p e a c e seemed distant.

Yet Trist's successful

negotiations with the Mexican government brought the movement to a
sudden halt.

The popular will to annex Mexico was born out of

desperation for a worthy p e a c e , a n d the opportunity to gain such a
p e a c e , albeit less ambitious than some had hoped, carried the Treaty of
Guadalupe-Hidalgo through Washington.
When the treaty was ratified by the Senate in March 1848, the all
Mexico issue b e c a m e a moot point. The United States withdrew its army
a n d confirmed Mexicans' right to a sovereign, though drastically smaller,
nation of their own. However, from a historical perspective, Americans'
faith in their country's capability to annex Mexico remains significant.
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First, highlighting the absence of controversy over America's ability
to dominate Mexico provides a better understanding of the all Mexico
debate as a whole.

It offers a different perspective from historians'

traditional analyses of the movement's growth and decline, filling a gap in
the historiography.

It also clarifies the boundaries between points of

controversy and subjects of agreement in a subject that is normally
treated as strictly divisive.
Second, identifying the reasons why Americans did not challenge
the feasibility of all Mexico illustrates important ideas that helped construct
the ideology of Manifest Destiny. Racism, Anglo-Saxonism, and a general
confidence in American strength were prevalent in contemporary
American society.

These key components of the cultural concept of

Manifest Destiny conspired to depict the United States as superior and
capable of dominating Mexico.
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